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Passion's Puzzle
Stephen P. Garvey
ABSTRACT: The puzzle of the provocation defense, otherwise known as the
"heat of passion" defense, is to figure out how, if at all, each of the basic
elements or features of the doctrine can be explained in a coherent and
normatively attractive fashion. None of the prevailing theories of
provocation can solve this puzzle. These theories either fail to explain one or
more of the doctrine's basic elements, or else end up committing the state to a
decidedly illiberal course of action: punishing citizens not only for what they
do (for their actions), but for who they are (for their characters).
The theory advanced here purports to offer a solution. According to this
theory, called the akrasia theory, the basic elements of the defense work in
concert to achieve the normatively attractive goal of sorting actors who kill
in defiance of the law (and who should therefore be convicted of murder)
from those who kill in a moment of culpable ignorance of law or weakness of
will (and who should therefore be convicted of the lesser crime of man-
slaughter). Insofar as this theory justifies and so defends the basic contours
of existing provocation doctrine, it challenges those who view the doctrine, in
some or all of its formulations, as a pernicious presence in the criminal law.
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INTRODUCTION
The following vignettes are based on facts drawn from reported cases:
" Claudia Brenner and Rebecca Wight were hiking along the
Appalachian Trail in the mountains of south central
Pennsylvania.' The couple stopped for the night and made
camp. They were "engag[ed] in lesbian lovemaking" when a
"mountain man"2 named Stephen Carr happened upon them.
Armed with a .22-caliber rifle, Carr shot the two women,
wounding Brenner and killing Wight. Carr said he had become
enraged at the sight of the "'show' put on by the women,
including their nakedness, their hugging and kissing and their
oral sex."
3
* Alma was the sixteen-year-old daughter of Sealous Grugin.4
Another of Grugin's daughters, Louella, was married to Jeff
Hadley, who had "carried [her] away."' Grugin disliked
Hadley's "bad habits,"6 and "bad blood"7 soon formed between
the two men. About a year later, Hadley raped Alma, who
reluctantly disclosed the assault to her father the following
month. Armed with a shotgun, Grugin went to Hadley's home.
He intended to "take charge of [Hadley] until [he] could get
an officer."8 Approaching Hadley, Grugin asked, 'Jeff, whatever
possessed you to rape Alma, my daughter?" Hadley replied, "I
will do as I damn please about it,"9 whereupon Grugin shot and
killed him in "hot blood." 0
" Morgan Smith was a carpenter. One evening he "received a visit
from his old friend James McCullagh."" Smith and McCullagh
were "both alcoholics and spent the evening in drinking and
recrimination." 2 Smith's grievances against McCullagh "went
back many years."03 Most recently, Smith believed McCullagh
1. Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
2. H.L. POHLMAN, THE WHOLE TRUTH: A CASE OF MURDER ON THE APPALACHIAN TRAIL 3
(1999).
3. Car-, 580 A.2d at 1364.
4. State v. Grugin, 47 S.W. 1058, 1059 (Mo. 1898).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1060.
9. Grugin, 47 S.W. at 1060.
10. Id. at 1066.
11. Regina v. Smith, [200014 All E.R. 289, 297 (H.L.) (opinion of Lord Hoffman).
12. Id.
13. Id.
1679
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had stolen some of his carpentry tools, sold them, and used the
money to "buy drink. 1 4 McCullagh denied the charge, and as
he repeated the denial, Smith become furious. With the "row in
full swing,"' 5 Smith grabbed a knife and stabbed McCullagh
several times, killing him.
In each of these cases the defendant claimed to have killed in the "heat
of passion," or what is more commonly today called provocation. The
doctrine of provocation has been part of the law for a very long time. l r
According to one statement of its common-law formulation, an intentional
homicide, which would otherwise constitute the crime of murder, is reduced
to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed upon adequate
provocation in the sudden heat of passion. 17 But while the doctrine of
provocation is well-established, the theory of provocation is not. Provocation
is a partial defense to murder, but why?
Traditional theories portray provocation as a species of justification or
excuse. i s According to these theories, provocation reduces murder to
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. For accounts of the doctrine's historical evolution in English common law, see LAW
COMM'N, CONSULTAION PAPER NO. 173, PARTIAL DEFENSES TO MURDER 3-1 to 3.43, at 27-38
(Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/cp173.pdf; JEREMY IIORDER,
PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 5-110 (1992). See also Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens
Rea: I-Provocation, Emotional Disturbance, and the Model Penal Code, 27 B.C. L. REV. 243, 249-305
(1986) (discussing English and American case law).
17. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.07, at 527 (3d ed. 2001).
Prior to the enactment of section 3 of the 1957 Homicide Act, the "classic direction" given to
English juries in cases alleging provocation was set forth in Regina v. Duffy, [1949] 1 All E.R.
932, 933 (Crim. App.). Current English law governing provocation is set forth in section 3 of
the 1957 Homicide Act. See Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 3 (Eng.) ("Where on a
charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that the person charged was
provoked ... to lose his self-control, the question whether the provocation was enough to make
a reasonable man do as he did shall be left to be determined by the jury."); see also ANDREW
ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW § 7.4(b), at 268-80 (4th ed. 2003) (describing
contemporary developments in English law); A.P. SIMESTER & G.R. SULLIVAN, CRIMINAL LAW:
THEORY AND DOCTRINE § 10.5, at 342-60 (2d ed. 2003) (same). For general descriptions of the
defense in American law, see, for example, DRESSLER, supra, § 31.07, at 527-33; WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.10, at 703-17 (3d ed. 2000); 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW
DEFENSES § 102, at 479-91 (1984). The Model Penal Code (MPG) mitigates murder to
manslaughter if the killing was "committed under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1985). A comparative study of Indian, English and Australian law on
provocation can be found in STANLEY YFO, UNRESTRAINED KILLINGS AND THE LAW:
PROVOCATION AND EXCESSIVE SELF-DEFENCE IN INDIA, ENGLAND AND AUSTRALIA (1998).
18. An actor who satisfies the conditions of a full justification is conventionally portrayed
as one who has done nothing the criminal law considers wrongful. See, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.1, at 759 (1978) ("A justification speaks to the rightness of the
act...."); B. Sharon Byrd, Wrongdoing and Attribution: Implications Beyond the Justification-Excuse
Distinction, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1289, 1290 (1987) ("A justification focuses on the wrongfulness of
an actor's conduct. It presupposes the violation of a legal or moral norm, but provides that this
1680 [2005]
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manslaughter because the killing was either justified or excused, though
only partially.'9 Partial-justification theories say that an adequately provoked
actor's killing is wrong, but not as wrong as it would have been if the actor
had been unprovoked or inadequately provoked.'o Partial-excuse theories
say that an adequately provoked actor's killing is just as wrong as an
unprovoked or inadequately provoked actor's killing, but the adequately
provoked actor is somehow less responsible or less blameworthy than his
unprovoked or inadequately provoked counterpart,2 Some theories try to
violation was the right thing to do under the circumstances."); Joshua Dressier, Justifcations and
Excuses: A BriefReview of the Concepts and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1161 (1987) ("In
its simplest form ... justified conduct is conduct that is a good thing, or the right or sensible
thing, or a permissible thing to do.") (internal quotations and citation omitted); Heidi M.
Hurd, Justification and Excuse. Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1551, 1558
(1999) ("Justified actions should be conceived of as right actions.... ."); cf Mitchell N. Berman,
Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2003) ("A justified action is not
criminal." (emphasis omitted)).
An actor who satisfies the conditions of a full excuse is conventionally portrayed as one
who has done something wrongful, but he has done so in or under circumstances rendering
him blameless. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra, at 759 ("[An excuse [speaks] to whether the actor is
accountable for a concededly wrongful act."); Byrd, supra, at 1290 ("An excuse... focuses on
the blame we may fairly attribute to the actor."); Dressier, supra, at 1162-63 ("An excuse is in
the nature of a claim that although the actor has harmed society, she should not be blamed or
punished for causing that harm."); Hurd, supra, at 1558 ("[E]xcused actions should be
conceived of as wrong actions done nonculpably."); cf Berman, supra, at 4 ("lAin excused
defendant has committed a crime but is not punishable." (emphasis omitted)).
19. Some jurisdictions recognize partial defenses to murder other than provocation. Most
notable among these defenses are diminished capacity and excessive or imperfect self-defense.
See generally PARTIAL EXCUSES TO MURDER pts. 1I & III (Stanley Meng Heong Yeo ed., 1990). For
commentary on the nature of partial excuses or defenses, see, for example, Douglas N. Husak,
Partial Defenses, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 167, 177 (1998), proposing a "unifying
hypothesis" according to which a "given circumstance qualifies as a partial defense if and only if
it bears a given relation to a complete justification or excuse"; Martin Wasik, PartialExcuses in the
Criminal Law, 45 MOD. L. REv. 516, 533 (1982), concluding among other things that the
"traditional arguments against partial excuses must surely be reconsidered." See also Suzanne
Uniacke, What Are Partial Excuses to Murder?, in PARTIAL EXCUSES TO MURDER, supra, at 1, 14-15
("A partial legal excuse ... recognizes that.., the accused's degree of culpability is sufficiently
reduced for it to be appropriate to convict him or her of a lesser offense.").
20. Finbarr McAuley is the scholar whose name is probably most commonly associated
with the partialjustification theory. See Finbarr McAuley, Anticipating the Past: The Defence of
Provocation in Irish Law, 50 MOD. L. REV. 133, 156 (1987) [hereinafter McAuley, Anticipating]
("[I]t is submitted that a defendant who can show that he killed in the face of substantial
provocation should, on this ground alone, be entitled to the defence." (emphasis added)); accord
Finbarr McAuley, Provocation: Partial Justification, Not Partial Excuse, in PARTIAL EXCUSES TO
MURDER, supra note 19, at 19, 29. Alan Norrie has also recently argued that modern English
provocation law, though purporting to be a partial excuse, functions in reality as a
"surreptitious[]" partial justification. Alan Norrie, The Structure of Provocation, 54 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS. 307, 338 (2001).
21. Joshua Dressier is the most prominent defender of a partial-excuse theory. Although
Dressier has modified his theory over the years, the basic idea has remained more or less the
same. A provoked actor is partially excused, according to Dressier, if and because he "barely
could" control his desire to kill in the face of the provocation. SeeJoshua Dressler, Provocation:
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combine elements of justification and excuse, usually saying that the
adequately provoked actor's anger may have been justified, but that the
killing itself is merely excused, and then only partially.
Partial Justification or Partial Excuse, 51 MOD. L. REV. 467, 472 (1988) [hereinafter Dressier,
Provocation]; Joshua Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 464 (1982) [hereinafter Dressier, Heat of Passion] ("[P]rovocation
is an excuse premised upon involuntariness based upon reduced choice-capabilities."); Joshua
Dressier, When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual
Advances, and the "Reasonable Man" Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 728-29 (1995)
[hereinafter Dressier, SexualAdvances] ("[P]rovocation... is an excuse-based defense.");Joshua
Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Dificult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV.
959, 962 (2002) [hereinafter Dressier, Difficult Subject] (stating that provocation "is a partial
excuse based on the actor's partial loss of self-control, although ... the reason for the actor's loss
of self-control sometimes (but not always) has ajustificatory-type component"). George Fletcher
also appears to embrace a partial-excuse theory, at least with respect to the MPC's formulation
of the doctrine. See FLETCHER, supra note 18, § 4.2.1, at 246 (1978) (The MPC's focus on
'extreme mental or emotional disturbance'.., makes it clear that the mitigation of homicide
to manslaughter is based solely on the actor's partial loss of control.").
Scholars who argue in favor of basing provocation exclusively on the actor's loss of self-
control without regard to the reasonableness thereof are also usually understood to embrace a
partial-excuse theory. See, e.g.,J.C. SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 215 ( 1st ed. 1965) ("It
is submitted that the objective test should be abolished, and a purely subjective criterion
applied."); Peter Brett, The Physiology of Provocation, 1970 CRIM. L. REV. 634, 638 (arguing for
elimination of the "reasonable man rule"); Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the
Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
435, 449-50 (1981) (urging elimination of the "reasonable man" requirement); Alec Samuels,
Excusable Loss of Self-Control in Homicide, 34 MOD. L. REV. 163, 170 (1971) ("Provocation as a head
of manslaughter could be abolished and replaced with the offence of criminal loss of self-
control ... ."); Singer, supra note 16, at 315 (arguing in favor of a "totally subjective approach");
Jack K. Weber, Some Provoking Aspects of Voluntary Manslaughter Law, 10 ANGLO-AM. L. REX'. 159,
160 (1981) ("All in all. . . it seems possible to conclude that heat of passion alone would be
justification for reducing an offence from murder to voluntary manslaughter."); see also R.S.
O'Regan, Indirect Provocation and Misdirected Retaliation, 1968 CRIM. L. REV. 319, 323-24 (arguing
for abolition of the so-called misdirected retaliation rule, a rule typically associated with partial-
justification theories).
22. For various arguments to this effect, see ASHWORTH, supra note 17, § 6.5(b), at 233
("The element of wrongdoing by the victim (or another) might therefore be combined with the
excusatory element of loss of self-control to provide grounds for a (partial) defence."); HORDER,
supra note 16, at 156 ("[T]he defence of provocation is an excuse, although it involves
significant elements of moral justification... ."); SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL:
RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER 141 (1998) ("We grant mitigation when
a person has been provoked because... the person had good reason for strong anger, and...
in experiencing such anger, the person's .moral restraints were temporarily strained to the
breaking point."); A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292, 307 (1976)
("[T]he doctrine of provocation as a qualified defence rests just as much on notions of
justification as upon the excusing element of loss of self-control."); Marcia Baros, Killing in the
Heat of Passion, in SETTING THE MORAL COMPASS: ESSAYS BY WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS 353, 366-69
(Cheshire Calhoun ed., 2004) (suggesting how an understanding of "provocation as a hybrid of
justification and excuse" might work); Timothy Macklem & John Gardner, Provocation and
Pluralism, 64 MOD. L. REV. 815, 819 (2001) (arguing that provocation is an excuse but "in
making an excuse one relies on the fact that one's unjustified action was taken on the strength
of a justified belief or attitude or emotion"); Uma Narayan c Andrew von Hirsch, Three
Conceptions of Provocation, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1996, at 15, 18-19 (proposing a
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The theory advanced here portrays provocation as neither justification
nor excuse, partial or otherwise Rather than being squeezed into either
category, provocation is better understood as a doctrine through which the
law tries to distinguish killings committed in defiance of the law (murder)
from those committed in a moment of culpable ignorance of law or weakness of
will (manslaughter). Provocation therefore distinguishes between two
different forms or modes of criminal culpability.24 Consequently, portraying
provocation as an imperfectjustification or excuse is a misportrayal.
An actor who knows that the law forbids killing, but nonetheless
wholeheartedly chooses to kill, defies the law. In contrast, an actor who kills
in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation violates the law, but he
does not defy it, either because he honestly and momentarily (though
unreasonably) believes the law allows him to kill (a case of culpable
ignorance of law), or because, though he realizes the law permits no such
thing, and though believing it best to comply and wanting to comply, he fails
"moral conflict" model of provocation in which the "provoked actor's diminished culpability [is
explained] in terms of the conflict in moral sentiments evoked by the victim's wrongful
conduct"); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment,
74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 678 (1989) ("Th[e] distinction [between a valid case of provocation
and an invalid one] lies not in differences in the feeling of sudden anger but in the reason for
such anger.").
Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg have "propose[d] that the common law
requirements [of provocation] be replaced by two separate tests, reflecting the two conceptions
of impaired volition and resentment, respectively." Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg,
Provocation and Culpability, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 241, 253
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987). In other words, provocation should be split into a partial-
excuse defense and a partialjustification defense, with the "doctrinal particulars" adjusted
accordingly. Id. at 255.
23. Others have also claimed provocation is neither an excuse nor a justification as those
terms are commonly understood. See, e.g., Dan Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of
Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 320 (1996) (stating that "justification' and
'excuse' fail to explain the [provocation] doctrine... [as those] concepts [are] currently
understood"); Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense,
106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1397-99 (1997) (stating that neither partial-justification theories nor partial-
excuse theories can explain all the doctrinal requirements of provocation but ultimately
characterizing her proposed theory as an excuse-based theory). I suggest that the Kahan-
Nussbaum and Nourse theories of provocation are best understood as partial-justification
theories, see infra pp. 1717-22 (discussing Kahan-Nussbaum); infra pp. 1723-26 (discussing
Nourse), although they can also be interpreted as excuse-based theories in which the adequate-
provocation requirement functions as a forfeiture rule. See infra pp. 1709-17 (explaining how
the adequate-provocation requirement can function as a forfeiture rule).
24. For more on these two forms of culpability, see Stephen P. Garvey, Two Kinds of
Criminal Wrongs, 5 PUNISHMENT & SOc'y 279, 280-90 (2003). See also RONALD D. MILO,
IMMORALITY 234 (1984) (distinguishing "six main types of immoral behavior"). Milo's focus is
on forms of immoral behavior, while mine is on forms of illegal behavior. The form of
immorality Milo calls "preferential wickedness" corresponds mutatis mutandis to what I call
"defiance," while that which I call "akratic" encompasses and corresponds mutatis mutandis to
what Milo calls "moral negligence" and "moral weakness." Id.
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to do so (a case of culpable weakness of will).25 Either way, the provoked
killer's culpability consists in something other than willful defiance of the
law.
Instead of defiance, the provoked killer's culpability consists in his
failure to control the desire to kill, a desire resulting from provocation and
the heat of passion, such that at the moment he acts, his desire to kill leads
him to believe (erroneously and unreasonably) that the law allows him to
kill; or, knowing the law does not allow him to kill and believing he should
conform to its demand not to kill, he nonetheless succumbs to his lethal
21desire. The Greek word for such failures is akrasia. On this view,
provocation is neither an excuse nor a justification, at least as those terms
are commonly understood in criminal-law scholarship. Rather, provocation
is a way of distinguishing those whose action manifests one form of
culpability (defiance) from those whose action manifests another (akrasia).27
Provocation sorts culpable killers into the appropriate category.28
25. For present purposes no distinction is drawn between "weakness of will" and "akrasia,"
which are both understood to involve an act freely and intentionally done against the actor's
better judgment. See, e.g., ALFRED R. MELE, IRRATIONALITY: AN ESSAY ON AKRASIA, SELF-
DECEPTION, AND SELF-CONTROL 7 (1987). According to Mele:
An action A is a strict incontinent action if and only if it is performed intentionally
and freely and, at the time at which it is performed, its agent consciously holds a
judgment to the effect that there is a good and sufficient reason for his not
performing an A at that time.
Id. For an alternative analysis according to which weakness of the will consists in an actor's
failure to act on an intention formed consistent with his betterjudgment, see Richard Holton,
Intention and Weakness of Will 96J. PHIL. 241, 241 (1999).
26. SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARYOF PHILOSOPHY 10 (1994).
27. Anthony Duff has recently written:
[lit cannot plausibly be argued that one whose commission of a crime exhibited
weakness of will rather than true Aristotelian vice should therefore be acquitted, or
should be convicted only of a lesser offense. Whether the offense is serious... or
relatively minor. .. , we can imagine it being committed either through weakness
of will by one who gives in to a temptation that he knows, in some sense, he should
resist, or through vice by one who is wholeheartedly involved in the wrong he does:
but both commit.., the same offense.
R.A. Duff, Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an Aristotelian Criminal Law?, 6 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 147, 168-69 (2002); see also Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal
Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 388 ("As a positive matter .. current criminal law grades
neither crimes nor punishments according to the agent's wholeheartedness."). Setting aside
possible questions about the relationship between "true Aristotelian vice" and my conception of
defiance, the analysis advanced here maintains that in at least one pocket of the law-
provocation-the law does convict of a lesser offense those whose crime exhibited weakness of
will. Indeed, Duff goes onto say, with hesitation but seemingly with approval, that "it might be
argued that the distinction [between vice and weakness of will] does become relevant at the
stage of sentencing." Duff, supra, at 169; see also Morse, supra, at 388 (suggesting that one might
think "as a normative matter that [the criminal law] should" grade crimes and punishments
"according to [an] agent's wholeheartedness"). The basis for Duffs recognition of the
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The argument unfolds in three parts. Part I describes the essential
elements or features of provocation. These elements form the pieces, so to
speak, of provocation's puzzle. A successful theory of provocation must be
able to assemble these pieces in a coherent and normatively attractive
manner. Part II argues that none of the prevailing theories of provocation
passes this test. Some fail to explain all of the doctrine's elements. Others
succeed in doing so only at the cost of punishing some provoked actors, not
for what they have done, but for who they are. In other words, these latter
theories punish some actors, not for the character of their actions, but for
the content of their characters. Such an illiberal use of state power renders
these theories decidedly unappealing. Part III sets forth the theory of
provocation as akrasia and argues that, unlike its competitors, it manages to
pull all the pieces of provocation's puzzle together into a normatively
attractive, or at least acceptable, whole. Part III also discusses the
relationship between provocation so conceived and the kindred doctrine of
diminished capacity.
My purpose here is to try to construct a theory to explain and justify,
and so defend, what I take to be provocation's essential elements.29
Accordingly, I avoid taking sides in on-going debates over whether, for
instance, the doctrinal specifics of the defense should be formulated more
along the lines of the Model Penal Code (MPC) or more along the lines of
the common law.30 The real debate lies deeper. It deals with how
distinction's relevance at sentencing, but his rejection of its relevance for purposes of grading,
is not clear to me.
28. H.L.A. Hart long ago identified the basic premise on which the theory developed here
rests. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 153 (1968) (claiming that in cases of
provocation and diminished capacity the actor is "punished in effect for a failure to exercise
control"). A more recent account similar to the one offered here can be found in HORDER,
supra note 16, at 176-83, though Horder actually offers at least three distinct theories for
explaining the excusatory and justificatory elements of provocation- See id. at 160-83; see aLo
GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY .AND PARTIAL ExcusEs 128 (1998) (claiming
that the "loss of control requirement ... from the viewpoint of the excuse theory... constitutes
the true basis of the provocation defence"); Richard Holton & Stephen Shute, You Can't Lose
WhatYou Ain't Never Had: Self-Control in the Modern Provocation Defence 2 (Aug. 14, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Iowa Law Review) (analyzing modern English
provocation law with the aim of "tak[ing] the idea of self-control seriously" and arguing that
"much of the work that [provocation's objective test has] been called upon to do is properly
done by the subjective test").
29. Because my focus is on the doctrine of provocation, and not on how that doctrine is in
fact applied by judges and juries in the context of particular cases, I remain open to the
possibility that the law in action might be best explained by one of the theories I find
inadequate as an explanation for the law on the books.
30. On balance, however, I am presently inclined to believe a relatively broad formulation
of the doctrine, as reflected, for example, in the manslaughter provision of the MPC, is to be
preferred over the relatively narrow formulation of the common law. Moreover, whereas
provocation is a partial defense limited to the crime of murder, I agree with those, most notably
Stephen Morse, who argue in favor of a generic partial defense, usually described as an excuse,
1685
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provocation, reduced to its essentials, should be understood or portrayed,
and whether the law should recognize it as a defense at all. Moreover, a
defense of provocation's essentials is needed now more than ever, for the
number of scholars misportraying provocation, 3 1 as well as the number
calling for its outright abolition, appears on the rise. My hope is to stem
the tide.
I. THE PUZZLE'S PIECES
33An actor who intentionally kills another, and who, in the absence of a
valid excuse or justification, would therefore be guilty of murder, will instead
applicable to all crimes. See infra note 187 (discussing proposals for such a generic partial
excuse).
31. The misportrayals I have in mind, both of which are discussed in some detail below,
are twofold: first, efforts to portray provocation as a partial justification, see infra text
accompanying notes 56-68; and second, efforts to portray it as a partial excuse in which the
adequate-provocation requirement functions as a forfeiture rule, see infra text accompanying
notes 92-99. The former portrayal, whatever its normative merits or demerits, cannot explain
provocation doctrine as we know it, while the latter is normatively unattractive insofar as it ends
up punishing inadequately provoked actors not for what they have done (for their acts), but for
who they are (for their characters).
32. Such calls can be found in HORDER, supra note 16, at 194-95 (arguing that
provocation should be abolished because, among other things, the desire for retaliatory
suffering on which it is based is "ethically 'defeasible'"); Matthew Goode, The Abolition of
Provocation, in PARTIAL EXCUSES TO MURDER, supra note 19, at 55 (concluding that the
"arguments for abolishing the defence are, taken overall, much stronger than the arguments
for retaining it, unless one is in ajurisdiction in which murder penalties remain inflexible");
Jeremy Horder, Autonomy, Provocation and Duress, 1992 CRIM. L. REv. 706, 712 (urging
elimination of provocation as a "confession and avoidance" defense (like duress) and
emphasizing "the very real potential of provocation to be pleaded, just as intoxication is
pleaded, as a straightforward denial of specific intent, in all crimes (not just murder) where
such an intent must be proven"); Kyron Huigens, Homicide in Aretaic Terms, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 97, 134 (2002) (stating that provocation "ought to be abolished as pernicious and
unnecessary"); Celia Wells, Provocation: The Casefor Abolition, in RETHINKING ENGLISH HOMICIDE
Lkw 85, 85 (Andrew Ashworth & Barry Mitchell eds., 2000) (concluding that provocation
should be abolished as a defense because it "is bound to encourage and exaggerate a view of
human behaviour which is sexist, homophobic, and racist"); cf Stephen J. Morse, Diminished
Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 290 (2003) ("I... believe,
buttressed by more recent feminist analysis, that traditional provocation/passion doctrine is
unwise."). The Law Reform Commission of the Australian state of Victoria has also recently
recommended the abolition of provocation. See VICTORIA LAw REFORM COMM'N, DEFENCES TO
HOMICIDE: FINAL REPORT xlv (2004) ("The partial defence of provocation should be abolished.
Relevant circumstances of the offence, including provocation, should be taken into account at
sentencing as they currently are for other offences."), available at http://www.lawreform.
vic.gov.ai/CA256902000FE1 54/Lookup/Homicide Final_Report/$file/FinalReport.pdf.
33. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 17, § 31.03[A], at 506. Provocation is usually raised
against a charge of intent-to-kill murder, though it can be and has been recognized in many
(but apparently not all) jurisdictions as a partial defense to other forms of murder, such as
intent to inflict serious bodily harm and depraved-heart murder. See, e.g., id., § 31.07[A], at 527;
LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 7.10, at 703-04. Jeremy Horder has suggested that "[iun so far as a
particular (kind of) provoked retaliation is a spontaneous response to sudden feeling, like
bowing one's head in shame or putting one's hands to one's head in despair, it may in some
HeinOnline -- 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1686 2004-2005
PASSION'S PUZZLE 1687
be found guilt, of manslaughter if he loses self-control in the face of
adequate provocation and kills while in the heat of passion, provided his loss
of self-control was reasonable. So understood, the provocation doctrine has
four basic elements or features:
(1) The provocation to which the actor responds must have been
adequate;
(2) The killing must have occurred while the actor was in the "heat
of passion
(3) The actor must have lost self-control, and his loss of self-control
must have been reasonable, such that a reasonable person in the
actor's situation would likewise have lost control and killed;3 5 and
cases be regarded as intentional but not as specifically intended." Horder, supra note 32, at 714.
Such a claim presupposes that an action can coherently be described as intentional but not
intended. Assuming such a description is indeed coherent, cases of provocation meeting it
would be cases in which the defendant should be able to assert a failure-of-proof defense based
on lack of mens rea.
34. The passion or emotion (I treat the terms equivalently) implicated in cases of
provocation is usually thought to be anger or resentment, inasmuch as anger or resentment is
the emotion produced or experienced in response to provocation. Those who favor excuse-
based theories of provocation are apt to be more ecumenical with respect to the range of
passions on which an actor can rely in support of a plea of provocation. See, e.g., Dressier, Sexual
Advances, supra note 21, at 746 n.108 ('Although courts usually talk about passion as if anger
were the only emotion that the law recognizes, any intense emotion will suffice." (citation
omitted)). Nonetheless, provocation might fairly be limited to cases involving anger insofar as
the desire attending anger, unlike the desire attending other emotions, is the desire to retaliate
against or punish a person in response to his culpable wrongdoing. See, e.g-, AARON BEN-ZE'EV,
THE SUBTLETY OF EMOTIONS 381-82 (2000); ROBERT C. ROBERTS, EMOTIONS: AN ESSAY IN AID OF
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 204 (2003); ROBERT C. SOLOMON, THE PASSIONS 288-89 (1976); James R.
Averill, Anger, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 1978 71-73 (Richard A. Dienstbier ed.,
1979). In this regard, however, one must keep in mind that one emotion can lead to another, as
when shame leads to anger, or when envy leads to shame, which leads finally to anger. See, e.g.,
JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND EMOTIONS 328-31 (1999) (noting the
envy-shame-anger dynamic in the context of explaining "that the place of the emotions in the
explanation of behavior is very complex").
35. The "reasonable loss of self-control" requirement-if taken at face value-turns out to
be an insuperable obstacle to any coherent theory of provocation. The problem can be simply
stated: a reasonable person never loses his self-control to the point of using lethal violence, no
matter what the provocation. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 18, § 4.2.1, at 247 ("[I J n the context
of provocation, the reasonable person is hardly at home .... [Als everyone is prepared to
admit, the reasonable person does not kill at all, even under provocation."); Glanville Williams,
Provocation and the Reasonable Man, 1954 CRIM. L. REV. 740, 742 ("[Hjow can it be admitted that
that paragon of virtue, the reasonable man, gives way to provocation?"). If so, then provocation
should never be a defense to murder. See, e.g., SIMESTER & SULLIVAN, supra note 17,
§ 10.5(b)(iii), at 348 ("[Provocation] should rarely succeed: for how often, surely, would the
reasonable person intentionally kill, in peacetime, except in self-defence or to protect the lives of
others?"). Alternatively, if an actor's loss of self-control was reasonable, then provocation should
be a full defense, and not simply a partial one. See, e.g., id. ("[l]f it really were true that a
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(4) The defense afforded to an actor who satisfies the conditions
identified in (1) through (3) is a partial defense. It mitigates
murder to manslaughter, but does not provide a full or complete
defense .
Different jurisdictions spell out the first and third of these requirements
in different ways. At common law, for example, an alleged provocation was
reasonable person in D's situation would also have killed V, the appropriate verdict should be
an acquittal."); Uniacke, supra note 19, at 13. According to Uniacke:
[P]rovocation is inadequately defined as a partial excuse if its conditions require
that a reasonable person would have lost self control in the circumstances. (If this
strong condition is met, provocation should be a complete excuse because the
accused cannot reasonably be expected not to have lost self-control. For this
reason, the condition increasingly emphasized by the courts--that an ordinary
person could have lost self-control in the circumstances-more accurately captures
the notion of a wrongful act which is blameworthy, but sufficiently humanly
understandable in the circumstances to be partially excused.)
Id.
Accordingly, the reasonable loss of self-control requirement cannot be taken at face
value. The literature suggests four strategies for dealing with this problem. First, it can be dealt
with through elimination: the reasonable loss of self-control requirement can simply be
eliminated and treated as no part of the doctrine. Second, it can be dealt with through
subjectification: the reasonableness of the actor's loss of self-control can be evaluated in
comparison to a "subjectified" reasonable person standard, which taken to its logical conclusion
amounts to a roundabout way of eliminating the requirement, since the issue is no longer
whether the actor's loss of self-control was reasonable, but rather (and simply) whether the
actor did in fact lose self-control. Third, it can be dealt with through consolidation: the
reasonableness of an actor's loss of self-control can be defined exclusively in terms of the
adequacy of the provocation, such that the "reasonableness" element of the reasonable loss of
self-control requirement is again effectively eliminated, since the requirement would no longer
have any meaning or function independent of the adequate-provocation requirement. Fourth,
and perhaps most commonly, it can be dealt with through substitution: the "ordinary" person
can be substituted for the "reasonable" person; or what "a" reasonable person "might" have
done for what "the" reasonable person "would" have done; or what it would not have been
unreasonable" for a reasonable person to have done for what it would have been "reasonable"
for him to have done. I ultimately endorse a version of the substitution strategy. See infra pp.
1726-45.
36. Provocation is partial not only because its effect is limited to mitigating murder to
manslaughter. It is also partial because its scope is limited: it applies to no crime other than
murder. This limitation is fairly subject to criticism. See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 17, § 6.5(c),
at 234 ("[lhf there is a case for.., a broadly drawn defence based on emotional or mental
disturbance [as in the MPC's manslaughter provision], is it right that it should be available only
in murder cases[?]"); Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and
Conceptual Review, in 23 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 329, 398 (Michael Tonry
ed., 1998) ("[Wlhy should partial excuse mitigation not be available to an arsonist acting in the
heat of passion ... , in extreme mental or emotional disturbance, or with substantially impaired
mental responsibility?"); see also B. Sharon Byrd, On Getting the Reasonable Person Out of the
Courtroom, 2 OHIO S'r.J. CRIM. L. 571, 577 (2005) (developing an approach to provocation that
"generalizes the provocation defense so it can apply to all criminal offenses"); Wasik, supra note
19, at 523 (observing that "[i]n the case of provocation.., there is a great deal of evidence in
[some] jurisdictions of the partial excuse operating to affect liability.., beyond the scope of
homicide").
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inadequate as a matter of law if it fell outside certain narrow categories of
adequacy, and was adequate as a matter of law if it fell within them:
Moreover, assuming loss of self-control played any role at common law3" an
actor who killed in the face of adequate provocation was presumed to have
done so because he lost control. Any such loss of control was also presumed
to have been reasonable, provided the lapse of time between the
provocation and the killing was insufficient to have permitted a reasonable
person to cool off and regain self-control.
In contrast, the MPC mitigates murder to manslaughter if the killing
took place "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse."3g The
37. The classic statement of the four common-law categories of adequate provocation is
contained in Lord Holt's opinion in Regina v. Mawgnidge, 84 E.R. 1107, 1114-15 (Q.B. 1707). See
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a), at 57-58 (1980) (discussing traditional categories of
adequate provocation); HORDER, supra note 16, at 30-39 (discussing the historical development
of the traditional categories in English law).
38. An uncontroversial statement of the common law rule is impossible. Cf LAW COMM'N,
supra note 16, 3.43, at 38 ("Examination of the development of the defence [in English
common law] reveals that before 1957 it had no consistent moral basis."). With that reality in
mind, Jeremy Horder maintains that the early English common-law cases and commentaries
(up until the mid-eighteenth century or so) made "no mention whatsoever.., of the modern
notion of 'loss of self-control.'" HORDER, supra note 16, at 42. Instead, "judges and
commentators used only such terms as the 'heating' or the 'stirring' of the blood to express the
subjective condition" of the defense. See id. at 42 n.l15. The element of loss of self-control
entered English common law sometime thereafter, such that the common-law categories were
no longer understood as circumstances under which the provoked actor was partially justified
in killing, but rather as evidence supporting the actor's claimed loss of self-control. See id. at 87-
89; see also Ashworth, supra note 22, at 295. According to Ashworth:
[T] he [common law] categories of provocation were seen as indicating the relative
gravity of the provocation and the consequent probability that it was an
understandable weakness of self-control rather than wickedness of mind which
caused the offence.... [But ilt was implicit in the categories.., that proof of
sudden loss of self-control alone was insufficient to establish the defence of
provocation.
Id.
Loss of self-control is an explicit element of section 3 of the 1957 Homicide Act. See
Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 3 (Eng.) ("Where on a charge of murder there is
evidence on which the jury can find that the person charged was provoked ... to lose his self-
control, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he
did shall be left to be determined by thejury.. ").
39. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1985). The MPC provides that the "reasonableness
of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's
situation tinder the circumstances as he believes them to be," id., thus inviting some unspecified
degree of subjectification or individualization of the reasonable person standard. See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a), at 62-63 (1980). Moreover, because it covers extreme mental
disturbance, as well as extreme emotional disturbance, and because it requires the
"reasonableness" of the actor's explanation or excuse to be assessed from the viewpoint of a
person in the actor's "situation," the MPC formulation is intentionally designed to encompass
cases sounding not only in provocation but also in diminished capacity. See id. § 210.3 cmt. 5(b),
at 72. I discuss the relationship between provocation and diminished capacity infra pp. 1738-44.
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MPC formulation eliminates the common law's categories of adequate
provocation, 40 requiring instead a "reasonable explanation or excuse" for
the disturbance under whose influence the actor killed. Like the common
law, the MPC's manslaughter provision makes no explicit reference to loss of
self-control, but the associated Commentary nonetheless puts loss of self-
control front and center. "In the end," according to the Commentary, "the
question is whether the actor's loss of self-control can be understood in
terms that arouse sympathy in the ordinary citizen."41
The common law's "heat of passion" defense and the MPC's "extreme
mental or emotional disturbance" defense are the usual reference points for
academic commentary on provocation. 42 The common-law formulation
tends to be more "objective," while the MPC's tends to be more
"subjective." 43 The common-law formulation prefers rules (the categories of
adequate provocation), while the MPC's prefers standards
(reasonableness) . 4 4 The common-law formulation, so it might be claimed, is
best understood as a partial justification, while the MPC's is best understood
as a partial excuse.4 5 Some commentators express sympathy for the common-
law formulation (or something akin to it),4" while others express sympathy
for the MPC's (or something akin to it).47
Without elaborating on these differences, and without meaning to
minimize their importance, the focus here will be on what I take to be the
40. Indeed, although provocation can constitute a "reasonable excuse or explanation," the
text of the MPC eliminates any explicit reference to provocation. See MODEL PENAL CODE §
210.3 cmt. 5(a), at 60-61 (1980) ("[T]he Code does not require that the actor's emotional
distress arise from some... provocative act perpetrated upon him by the deceased."). I thank
Joshua DressIer for emphasizing this point,
41. It. at63.
42. English commentary generally focuses on the elements set forth in section 3 of the
1957 Homicide Act. See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 17, § 7.4(b), at 268-79; SIMESTER &
SULLIvAN, supra note 17, § 10.5, at 342-60. Jeremy Horder has proposed a replacement for
section 3, which he sets forth in JEREMY HORDER, EXCUSING CRIME 98 (2004). For a more
extended discussion of this proposal, see Jeremy Horder, Reshaping the Subjective Element in the
Provocation Defence, 25 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 123, 134-39 (2005).
43. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 17, § 31.07[B] [2] [bl [i], at 531 (stating that the MPC
formulation is more subjective insofar as it requires the reasonableness of the explanation or
excuse for the actor's disturbance to be assessed from the viewpoint of a person "in the actor's
situation"),
44. See, e.g., id. § 31.07[B][2][b][i], at 529 ("The rigid common law categories of
'adequate provocation' have given way in many states [under the influence of the MPC] to the
view that the issue of what constitutes adequate provocation should be left to the jury to decide"
based on general notions of reasonableness.).
45. See, e.g., id. §31.07[C][2][a]-[b], at 535-36 (discussing the fit between various
features of the doctrine and partial-justification and partial-excuse theories).
46. See, e.g., Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 323 ("If the theme of the common law
manslaughter cases is 'virtuous rage,' the theme of the Model Penal Code is 'pathology.'").
47. See, e.g., Dressier, Difficult Subject, supra note 21, at 997 ("I have noted certain flaws in
the Model Penal Code manslaughter provision[, but d]espite my criticisms, the Code's overall
effort strikes me as positive.").
1690 [20051
HeinOnline -- 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1690 2004-2005
PASSION'S PUZZLE
doctrine's basic or essential elements. For convenience's sake, these will be
referred to as: (1) the adequate-provocation requirement; (2) the passion
requirement; (3) the reasonable loss of self-control requirement; and (4) the
partiality requirement. The first three requirements constitute the core
elements of the defense itself, while the fourth describes its legal effect,
48
which is to mitigate, not to exonerate.
This statement of the provocation doctrine's basic elements is bound to
elicit controversy. Provocation enjoys no canonical definition.49 Those who
see provocation as a partial justification might, for example, say that loss of
self-control, reasonable or otherwise, is not really part of the doctrine, or if it
is, it should not be, since the adequacy of the provocation to which the actor
responds is all that should matter.5 In contrast, those who see provocation
as a partial excuse might say that adequate provocation doesn't really
48. This statement of the doctrine makes no explicit reference to any "suddenness"
requirement, according to which the killing must occur in the sudden heat of passion. Nor does
it make explicit reference to any "cooling off" requirement, according to which an actor is
denied the defense if a reasonable person would have cooled off and regained his self-control
in the lapse of time between the provocation and the killing. Nor, finally, does it make explicit
reference to any "proportionality" or "reasonable relationship" requirement, according to
which an actor would be denied the defense if the manner in which he killed was out of
proportion to the provocation to which he was responding. For example, an actor would be
denied the defense if the manner of the killing was especially brutal in relation to an otherwise
adequate provocation.
In my view, each of these requirements can plausibly be understood to provide evidence
supporting the actor's claim to have killed only because he lost self-control. So, for example, if a
killing is committed suddenly (i.e., immediately upon witnessing the provocation), the more
likely the actor killed because, as a matter of fact, he lost self-control. See, e.g., SIMESTER &
SULIUVAIN, supra note 17, § 10.5(ii)(b), at 346. ("The need for a "sudden and temporary loss of
self-control" indicates that there must be something in the nature of a spontaneous response to
the provocation if it is to be claimed that D lost self-control.") Likewise, the less time that
elapses between the provocation and the killing (i.e., the less time to cool off), the more likely
the actor killed because, as a matter of fact, he lost self-control. See, e.g., id. ("[Alny lapse of time
between the last provocative incident and D's reaction will undermine D's claim to have lost
control."). Similarly, if the killing is done in a manner proportionate to the provocation, the
more likely the actor killed only because, as a matter of fact, he lost self-control, whereas a
killing done in a manner disproportionate to the provocation might suggest that the actor did
not even try to exercise self-control. The proportionality requirement, which traces its origins in
English law to Mancini v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions [1942] A.C. 1, 9 (1941), "has not explicitly
[been] implanted" in American law, Dressier, Heat of Passion, sutpra note 21, at 430, and
moreover, is "no longer a rule of law" in England, although "traces of it remain." ASHWORTH,
supra note 17, § 7.4(b) (iii), at 278.
49. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 18, § 4.2, at 242 ("[Plrovocation does not enjoy a
standard definition."). Dressier helpfully recounts the various "imprecise description[s] of the
elements of the defense" given by the common-law courts in Dressier, IHeat of Passion, supra note
21, at 432-34.
50. See, e.g., McAuley, Anticipating, supra note 20, at 156 ("[lIt is submitted that a
defendant who can show that he killed in the face of substantial provocation should, on this
ground alone, be entitled to the defence." (emphasis added)).
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belong, since loss of self-control is all that counts.5 ' Or, one might say that
adequate provocation and reasonable loss of self-control are not really
independent elements, since an alleged provocation is adequate if and only
if it would cause a reasonable person to lose his self-control, and conversely,
a reasonable person would only lose control in the face of adequate
provocation. 52 Still, insofar as none of the elements can be reduced to the
others, and insofar as each has some plausible claim for inclusion as an
element of the defense, a theory capable of accounting for all of them is,
ceteris paribus, better than one incapable of doing so.
Passion's puzzle is to figure out how, if at all, each of the elements or
features of the doctrine of provocation can be brought together into a
coherent and normatively attractive whole, and a theory of provocation can
be seen as an effort to solve that puzzle. Many such theories have been
offered, but none has managed to find a satisfying solution.
II. FAILED SOLUTIONS
Contemporary academic debate over the theory of provocation is
usually framed as a debate between those who argue provocation is (or
should be understood as) a partial justification, 2 and those who argue it is
(or should be understood as) a partial excuse, 54 with most contemporary
commentators treating it in one way or another as a partial excuse. 55 Two
partialjustification theories, and four partial-excuse theories can be found
in, or extracted from, the literature. 6 In the end, none provides the solution
sought.
51. See, e.g., Dressier, Provocation, supra note 21, at 475 n.46 ("I would .. not require
evidence of wrongful conduct as a prerequisite to finding manslaughter.").
52. See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 17, §7.4(b)(ii), at 271 ("[N]ot every act of
provocation ... should be allowed as the basis of this qualified defence, but only those serious
enough to unbalance the behaviour of a person with reasonable self-control."); LAFA.VE, supra
note 17, § 7.10, at 705 ("What is really meant by 'reasonable provocation' is provocation which
causes a reasonable man to lose his normal self-control.. . ."); Ashworth, supra note 22, at 298
("[T]he reasonable man... functions [in English law] as a means of assessing the gravity [or
adequacy] of the provocation.").
53. See sources cited supra note 20.
54. Seesources cited supra note 21.
55. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 18, at 73 ("According to the majority view, provocation is a
partial excuse....").
56. The discussion of partial-excuse theories presented below presupposes that the
criminal law is an institutional mechanism for the expression of blame, with excuses serving to
deflect such blame under appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing
Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 264 (1987) ("To blame a person is to express a moral criticism, and
if the person's action does not deserve criticism, blaming him is a kind of falsehood .... It is
this feature of our everyday moral practices that lies behind the law's excuses."). For reasons
others have ably set forth, I make no effort to explain provocation in utilitarian terms. See
Dressier, Difficult Subject, supra note 21, at 963-66; Dressier, Heat of Passion, supra note 21, at 434
n.136.
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A. PARTIAL-JUSTFICA TION THEORIES
According to partial-justification theories, the provocation doctrine
mitigates murder to manslaughter because an actor who intentionally kills in
the face of adequate provocation is, though guilty of a crime, guilty of a
lesser crime than an actor who intentionally kills in the face of no
provocation or in the face of inadequate provocation.57 Such theories try to
explain why an adequately provoked actor's crime is a lesser crime. Two such
theories can be identified. The first focuses on the nature of the adequately
provoked actor's motives (the worthy-motive theory); the second focuses on
the nature of his action in response to the provocation (the
disproportionate-response theory).
1. Worthy Motives
The law generally permits a private actor to kill only in self-defense or in
defense of others.58 It does not permit an actor to kill in response to
I would note, however, that commentators who argue that this or that alleged
provocation should be treated as inadequate as a matter of law often appear to do so on
utilitarian grounds. These commentators would impose murder liability on an actor who kills
upon provocation considered adequate according to some disapproved norm or system of
norms, but inadequate according to the commentator's preferred norm or system of norms.
They would do so in an effort to change the disapproved norm or system of norms and thus the
beliefs of actors who hold beliefs consistent with that norm or system of norms. See, e.g., Kahan
& Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 363-65 (arguing that judges should declare certain kinds of
provocation inadequate "as a matter of law rather than permit[] juries" from "political
communities in which bad morality predominates.., to decide this issue as a matter of fact").
Imposing murder liability on the inadequately provoked actor works as a means to achieve
these ends, which requires using the inadequately provoked actor himself as a means to achieve
these ends.
57. The concept of a "partial justification" is puzzling. A justified action is usually
understood to mean an action one is (at least) permitted to do, and any particular action can
be described as either permissible or impermissible. But it makes no sense to say a particular
action is "partially permitted." The logic of permission is all-or-nothing. See Uniacke, supra note
19, at 16 n.8 (arguing that the "concept of a partial justification for a particular act or offence
[does not] make[] sense" (emphasis omitted)). So-called partialijustification theories of
provocation should therefore be described as lesser wrong theories. The adequately provoked
actor's killing is less wrongful than, but in the eyes of the lawjust as impermissible as, any other
unjustified killing.
58. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04(l), 3.05(1) (1985). The MPC also permits an
actor to kill when doing so is the lesser of two evils, id § 3.02(1), and under limited
circumstances when necessary for the protection of property. Id. § 3.06(3)(d). In addition, the
MPC allows an actor to claim duress as a defense to murder. Id. § 2.09(1). Yet insofar as the
MPC treats duress as an excuse, and not a justification, an actor who kills under duress should
not be understood as having the law's permission to kill. Instead, he should be understood as
having the permission of some other system of norms to which the law condescends or defers.
See infta note 90 (discussing duress). Neither necessity nor duress were recognized as defenses
to murder at common law. See DRESSLER, supra note 17, § 22.02, at 287-89 (describing the
"parameters of the common law defense" and stating that "at least arguably the necessity
defense does not apply in homicide cases"); id. § 23.04, at 303 (stating that the "common law
rule ... is that duress is not a defense to an intentional killing").
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provocation, adequate or not. But an actor who kills upon adequate
provocation is one who has been seriously wronged in one way or another
according to some set of norms. The adequately provoked actor's anger is
therefore justified or warranted. According to the worthy-motive theory, the
law nonetheless continues to insist that he not express his anger with lethal
violence. However, if he does kill, he does so on the basis of a motive more
worthy, all else being equal, than the motive of one who kills in the absence
of adequate provocation. The law therefore considers the adequately
provoked killer less culpable than his unprovoked or inadequately provoked
counterpart. Accordingly, he deserves to be convicted of the lesser crime of
manslaughter.59
The worthy-motive theory can readily explain the adequate-provocation
and partiality requirements. An adequately provoked actor is one who kills
in retaliation for a serious wrong.") The adequate-provocation requirement
certifies the seriousness of the wrong and thus the worthiness of the actor's
retaliatory motive. The theory can also explain the partiality requirement.
The adequately provoked actor's motive for killing is more worthy in
comparison to the motive of an unprovoked or inadequately provoked actor,
but the adequately provoked actor has nonetheless done something the law
prohibits, despite his relatively more worthy motive. As such, he should still
be punished, albeit less so than if he had acted on a less worthy motive.
Unfortunately, the worthy-motive theory fails to explain the passion and
reasonable loss of self-control requirements. Insofar as the theory focuses on
the worthiness of the provoked actor's motive for killing, it makes no
difference whether the actor killed in hot blood or cold blood, nor whether
at the time of the killing the actor tried to control his desire to kill or not.61
59. Although the basis for his claim that provocation is a partial justification is not entirely
clear, McAuley appears to embrace a worthy-motive theory. See McAuley, Anticipating, supra note
20, at 21 (noting that "the defence entails a denial that the defendant's actions were entirely
wrongful in the first place," in the sense that it "implies that the defendant was partiallyjustified
in reacting as he or she did because of the untoward conduct of his or her victim"). Signs of the
worthy-motive theory can also be detected in Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 313 ("[T] he
law... condemn[s] acts that reflect at least some appropriate emotional motivations less
severely than acts that reflect only inappropriate emotional motivations.").
60. The adequacy of an alleged provocation can be determined according to different
systems of norms. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 18, § 4.2, at 243 (social norms); HORDER, supra
note 16, at 158 (moral norms derived from Aristotiean moral theory); Kahan & Nussbaum,
supra note 23, at 310 (social norms); Macklein & Gardner, supra note 22, at 827-28 (social
norms related to social roles); McAuley, Anticipating, supra note 20, at 138 (social norms);
Nourse, supra note 23, at 1392 (legal norms), Whatever system of norms is used, any
determination as to the adequacy of an alleged provocation will be uncertain and controversial
insofar as the content of the relevant norms is itself uncertain and controversial. Uncertainty
and controversy will also arise when the provocation facing an actor is adequate according to
one system of norms but inadequate according to another.
61. See, e.g., Dressler, Heat of Passion, supra note 21, at 458 ("[11f heat of passion is a partial
justification, the injustice [of the decedent's provocation], not the passion [of the actor], is the
primary focus."); id. ("To be consistent, passion should not be required [on a partial-
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So long as the defendant killed for the right reasons or motives (i.e., in
response to adequate provocation), neither the heat of the passion (if any)
within which he acts nor his failure to exercise control over his desire to kill
has any bearing on his claim to the defense. An actor who acts
wholeheartedly in executing a worthy retaliatory desire to kill deserves the
defense just as much as one who kills only because he fails to exercise self-
control and thus succumbs to his desire.62 The worthy-motive theory
therefore draws no distinction between the righteous vigilante and a
similarly-situated actor who kills only because he "loses it."
2. Disproportionate Response
Another partial-justification theory focuses not so much on the
provoked actor's motive for killing as on the nature of his response to the
provocation. 6 ' This theory recognizes, as does the worthy-notive theory, that
the law refuses to permit an actor to resort to any violence, lethal or non-
lethal, in the face of provocation, adequate or otherwise. At the same time, it
also recognizes that the law itself sometimes responds to wrongdoing with
violence (imprisonment), and in fact, sometimes with lethal violence
justification theory]."); McAuley, Anticipating, supra note 20, at 156 ("[l t is submitted that [on a
partial-justification theory] a defendant who can show that he killed in the face of substantial
provocation should, on this ground alone, be entitled to the defence ...."); Kenneth W.
Simons, Social Meaning, Retributivism, and Homicide, 19 LAW & PHIL. 407, 425 (2000) (hook
review) ("A pure 'partial justification' approach would ignore passion and loss of control
altogether.").
62. For one account of what it means for an actor to act wholeheartedly on a particular
desire, see Harry Frankfurt, Identification and Wholeheartedness, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER,
AND THE EMOTIONS, supra note 22, at 27. According to Frankfurt, an actor wholeheartedly acts
on the basis of a particular desire when that desire "is incorporated into himself by virtue of the
fact that he has it by his own will." Id. at 38. See also MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Identification, Decision,
and Treating as a Reason, in FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND AGENCY
185, 186-87 (1999) (sketching a proposal to "make systematic sense of... talk of identification"
that "is to some extent in the spirit of' the view put forth by Frankfurt in Identication and
Wholeheartedness). Additional discussions of Frankfurt's evolving notion of "identification" can
be found in various papers collected in CONTOURS OF AGENCY: ESSAYS ON THEMES FROM HARRY
FRANKFURT (Sarah Buss & Lee Overton eds., 2002).
63. Signs of the disproportionate-response theory can be found in Nourse, supra note 23,
at 1393 ("To maintain its monopoly on violence, the State must condemn, at least partially,
those who take the law into their own hands .... [But slome defendants who take the law in
their own hands respond with a rage shared by the law."); Narayan & von Hirsch, supra note 22,
at 19 (claiming that provocation "legitimates various forms of acting out: displaying outrage,
and taking various permissible overt steps against the wrongdoer .... [and that i]t is only certain
forms of acting out-such as resorting to violence-which are improper and which the moral
sense should inhibit"). Horder also appears to construe the Narayan-von Hirsch "moral
conflict" theory of provocation as a partial-justification theory, at least insofar as the theory fails
to provide any plausible reason to construe the doctrine as an excuse. See Jeremy Horder,
Reasons for Anger: A Response to Narayan and von Hirsch's Provocation Theory, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS,
Summer/Fall 1996, at 63, 67. Dressier describes and criticizes a version of the disproportionate-
response theory, which he calls the "comparative moral wrongdoing" theory, in Dressier, Heat of
Passion, supra note 21, at 456-59.
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(capital punishment). Thus, if the wrongdoing committed by a provocateur
constitutes a crime, the law itself would (upon trial and conviction) punish
him. It would not, of course, punish him with death, since only murder can
be so punished,"' and the provocateur does not kill the person he
provokes. 65 He gets killed.
According to the disproportionate-response theory, an alleged
provocation is adequate if and only if the provocateur's wrong is one that
the criminal law itself would punish. Consequently, an actor who kills in the
face of such provocation responds with violence when the law itself would
respond with violence. The adequately provoked actor's use of violence can
thus be said to be justified, but only so far as the violence he uses matches
that which the law would use. The adequately provoked actor gets into
trouble when and because he goes beyond the violence to which the law
itself would make recourse. He kills when the law would at most imprison.
On top of that, because the state claims a monopoly on the legitimate
use of violence, the adequately provoked actor who kills in response to the
provocateur's wrongdoing necessarily poaches on that authority. The
provocateur may have deserved punishment, but the actor who punished
him lacked the authority to do so. The state claims exclusive jurisdiction to
deliver retributive punishment, and it declines to delegate that jurisdiction
to private actors.
The adequately provoked actor is therefore guilty of a wrong, but only
because the punishment he inflicted usurped state authority and was
disproportionate to the provocateur's crime. Thus, although he should be
punished for his transgression, he should be punished less than he
otherwise would have been punished had the provocateur done nothing
meriting a punitive response.
The disproportionate-response theory, like the worthy-motive theory,
can explain the adequate-provocation and partiality requirements. The
provocation facing an actor must be adequate inasmuch as the law's own
norms, or the norms of some other system incorporated into the law or to
64. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
65. One can imagine cases in which the provocateur has killed someone other than the
person he provokes. Take, for example, a case in which the defendant comes upon a
provocateur who has just killed the defendant's child. If the defendant then kills the
provocateur, the defendant cannot avail himself of a defense-of-others justification because the
child, as the defendant can plainly see, is already dead when the defendant arrives on the scene.
However, if the killing of the child constitutes adequate provocation, the defendant may be able
to plead provocation. Moreover, if thejurisdiction in question authorizes the death penalty for
the provocateur's crime, then the defendant's resort to lethal violence in retaliation would
arguably constitute a proportionate response in comparison to the law's own response.
Consequently, the disproportionate-response theory would seem committed to affording a full
defense to the defendant in such a case. The only basis for denying him a full defense would be
the actor's usurpation of the state's claimed monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.
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which the law defers, 66 would permit the use of non-lethal violence in
657
response. If the relevant norms permitted no violence in response, then the
actor's resort to lethal violence would arguably be so disproportionate as to
provide no meaningful basis for mitigation. As for the partiality
requirement, the law is understood to permit the use of non-lethal violence
upon adequate provocation, either to avoid hypocrisy (in reference to its
own use of violence) or in deference to some other system of norms, but an
adequately provoked actor goes beyond the scope of this permission. He
resorts to lethal violence, which is a disproportionate response. He is
therefore only entitled to partial mitigation, not full exoneration.
Yet the disproportionate-response theory, again like the worthy-motive
theory, cannot explain the passion or reasonable loss of self-control
requirements. As the disproportionate-response theory sees it, the problem
with the adequately provoked actor rests entirely on the nature of his
response to the provocation. He goes too far. He might go too far because
he loses control and lets passion get the better of him, but the theory
requires neither passion nor loss of self-control. An actor who calmly decides
66. The disproportionate-response theory can be framed with reference to some system of
norms other than those of the criminal law, such as social norms. On this view, the applicable
norms, like the law's own norms, are understood to prohibit an actor from using lethal violence
in response to any form of wrongdoing (except in cases of self-defense or defense-of-others). At
the same time, those norms are assumed to permit the use of non-lethal violence in response to
some forms of wrongdoing. Adequate provocation is therefore any wrongdoing with respect to
which the applicable norms permit the use of non-lethal violence in response. The adequately
provoked actor's conduct can thus be said to be justified, but only so far as he uses non-lethal
violence. The problem, once again, is that the adequately provoked actor's response goes too
far. He kills when the applicable norms would permit only a punch. He is therefore guilty of a
wrong, but one less serious than if the provocateur had done nothing meriting a violent
response.
67. Insofar as the disproportionate-response theory assumes the relevant norms would
permit the use of non-lethal violence in response to adequate provocation, an actor who so
responds should be entitled to a full defense, since such an actor has responded
proportionately. Cf HORDER, supra note 16, at 135. As Horder explains:
Provocation could become a complete defence.., to (for example) assault,
battery, or wounding where the provocation preceding it was so very grave that the
offence was completely, and not merely partially, morally justified. The defence
would thus operate in such cases in much the same way that duress is, in certain
circumstances, a complete defence to crimes of violence other than murder.
Id. Although nojurisdiction in the United States appears to recognize such a defense, the law of
some Australian states apparently does. See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 17, § 6.5, at 231 n.162.
68. Cf HORDER, supra note 16, at 135 ("Reduction of an offence to a lesser offence.., is
only appropriate where the defendant did exceed the mean.. . , but did not exceed it too
greatly.... ."). If the applicable norms permitted the use of lethal violence, then provocation
would function much like duress and should be a full defense. Provocation would function like
duress insofar as duress fully excuses an actor whose violation of the criminal law, while
unjustified in the eyes of the criminal law itself, is nonetheless permissible according to some
other system of norms to which the law defers. See infra note 90 (explaining duress as a form of
justification).
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to kill a provocateur is no less entitled to a manslaughter conviction than is
his impassioned counterpart who kills only because he loses control. An
actor's permission to use non-lethal violence does not evaporate simply
because he freely chooses to step beyond its scope and employ lethal
violence.
When all is said and done, partial-justification theories cannot solve
provocation's puzzle. They fail to explain the heat of passion and reasonable
loss of self-control requirements. The puzzle remains unsolved.
Of course, partial-justification theories can be used to argue for changes
in the existing structure of homicide law. One might, for example,
reasonably believe the law should make a killing committed for a relatively
worthy motive a different and lesser crime than one committed for a
relatively unworthy motive, whether or not the killer acted in the heat of
passion or lost self-control. An actor who intentionally kills in order to
relieve the suffering of a terminally-ill friend who has pleaded for release
should not, one might reasonably believe, be put into the same category as
one who intentionally kills in order to humiliate or subordinate his victim.
The law, one might argue, should acknowledge their different motives,
convicting the former of a lesser offense and the latter of a greater one. But
again, my goal here is to offer a normatively defensible account of the law as
it is, not to offer advice on what it should be.
B. PARTIAL-ExCUSE THEORIES
According to the leading theory of excuse in criminal law, an actor who
would otherwise be criminally liable should be excused if, through no fault
of his own, he lacked either the capacity or a fair opportunity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law. 9
69. This theory of excuse is generally known as the "choice" theory because in simplest
terms it says that an actor should be excused if he did not freely choose to break the law. See
HART, supra note 28, at 152 ("What is crucial is that those whom we punish should have had,
when they acted, the normal capacities, physical and mental, for doing what the law requires
and abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair opportunity to exercise these capacities."); see also
Michael Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POLy 29, 32-40 (1990) (elaborating
on Hart's general statement). The choice theory is generally contrasted with the "character"
theory. See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liabiliy, 12 LAW & PHIL. 345, 345
(1993) (stating the usual contrast). But cf. id. at 380 (concluding that each theory "expresses,
but also distorts, a significant truth about what we can properly convict and punish people
for"). In fact, three very different theories of excuse-easily confused with one another-can
travel under the general heading of the character theory.
According to the first version, an actor should be excused if and because his criminal
action was "out of character" for him, presumably in the straightforward sense that it was
unusual or atypical for him. See, e-g., FLETCHER, supra note 18, § 10.3, at 800; Michael D. Bayles,
Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility, 1 LAW & PHIL. 5, 7 (1982); Richard B. Brandt, A
Motivational Theory of Excuses, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: NOMOS XXVII 165, 165 (J. Ronald Pennock
& John W. Chapman eds., 1985). This version of the character theory is descriptively and
normatively suspect. Descriptively, the criminal law has no compunction against convicting and
punishing an actor whose crime was "out of character" for him, provided he freely chose to
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commit the crime. See, e.g., Moore, supra, at 51. Normatively, insofar as this version of the
character theory excuses an actor if and when he acts out of character, it seems committed to
saying he should be punished only when he acts in character, which seems to imply he is
ultimately punished for his character, and not for his action. But a liberal state only punishes its
citizens for what they do, not for who they are. As Michael Moore has put it, "no one deserves to
be punished for being a poor specimen of humanity." See id. at 55. Thus, while acting out of
character in the sense specified may very well ground a grant of inercy, see, for example, John
Gardner, The Gist ofExcuse,, 1 BUFF. GRIM. L. REV. 575, 578 n.7 (1998), it should not ground an
excuse.
According to the second version of the character theory, an actor should be excused if
and because his actions were "out of character" inasmuch as the beliefs and desires constituting
his character and on the basis of which he freely chooses to act were not authentically his beliefs
and desires. The "authenticity" of an actor's beliefs and desires is widely thought to be a
requirement of responsibility for actions taken on the basis of those beliefs and desires. See, e.g.,
JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, S.J., RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF
MORAi RESPONSIBILITY 237-38 (1998): ISHTIYAQUE IHli, MORAL APPRAISABILITY: PUZZLES,
PROPOSALS, AND PERPLEXITIES 123 (1998). Although an actor can usually be presumed
responsible for the beliefs and desires on the basis of which he freely chooses to act, we may in
some cases be prepared to suspend this presumption. Beliefs and desires implanted through
coercive indoctrination or brainwashing are the least controversial examples. A brainwashed
actor acts "out of character" insofar as the beliefs and desires on which he otherwise freely acts
are not really constituent elements of his character. They are more like foreign invaders.
Whether this form of excuse should be recognized in the criminal law, and if so, how far it
should extend has been subject to considerable debate. Does it, for example, include not only
having been brainwashed, but also having come from a "rotten social background"? Compare
Richard Delgado, Ascription of Criminal States of Mind: Toward a Defense Theory for the Coercively
Persuaded ("Brainwashed") Defendant, 63 MINN. L. REv. 1, 10 (1978) ("In the case of the coercively
persuaded defendant, it is appropriate to ask ... whether the intent the actor possessed can
properly be said to be his own."), withJoshua Dressier, Professor Delgado's "Brainwashing" Defense:
Courting a Determist Legal System, 63 MINN. L. REV. 335, 337 (1979) ("[I] t is logically impossible
to frame a coercive perstasion defense that is both consistent with present criminal law...
and ... morally acceptable.").
At least three commentators of whom I am aware appear to suggest that provocation
can be explained along the lines of this second version of the character theory. See LAWRIE
REZNEK, EVIL OR ILL?: JUSTIFYING THE INSANITY DEFENSE 230 (1997) ("Provocation may
excuse... because it induces a temporary change in moral character."); Victor Tadros, The
Characters of Excuse, 21 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 495, 508 (2001) ("[O]nce one is extremely
angry, one's actions no longer reflect one's settled character quite as closely as they do when
one is calm."); William Wilson, The Filtering Role of Crisis in the Constitution of Criminal Excuses, 17
CAN.J.L. &JURISPRUDENCE 387, 411 (2004) (submitting more or less in agreement with Tadros
that passion excuses "because [it] may take us outside our constituted character and in so doing
subvert our normal responsiveness to reason"). On this view, adequate provocation produces in
the actor a desire to kill in retaliation. The actor then freely chooses to act on that desire.
Nonetheless, the actor should be (partially) excused for acting on that desire insofar as that
desire is not really a part of his character. The provocateur's actions have momentarily
implanted an alien desire to kill into the actor's character, thereby "destabilizing" it. Cf Tadros,
supra, at 503. When the adequately provoked actor freely acts on the basis of this alien desire,
his action is therefore temporarily "out of character."
Whatever its merits may otherwise be, this version of the character theory seems
unable to explain the provocation doctrine's reasonable loss of self-control and partiality
requirements. If the adequately provoked actor's desire to kill truly is an alien desire for which
the actor bears no responsibility, then it would seem to make no difference whether die actor
tried but failed to control the desire or not. The desire is not his in either case. But cf id. at 507
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In other words, a person should be excused if, through no fault of his
own, he could not have conformed his conduct to the requirements of law
(lack of capacity), or if he could, he nonetheless should not have been
expected to conform, because such conformity would have imposed on him
an unfair burden (lack of fair opportunity).
Either of these grounds for excuse-lack of capacity or lack of fair
opportunity-can be used to develop an excuse-based theory of provocation.
The idea behind any such theory is that an actor who intentionally kills in
the face of adequate provocation in the heat of passion should be partially
excused if and because he either could not control his desire to kill, or
because demanding such control would be an unfair demand under the
circumstances. Four excuse-based theories are described below, two based
on lack of capacity to conform, and two based on lack of fair opportunity to
conform .7
1. Incapacity
Incapacity theories of provocation come in two forms. According to the
total-incapacity theory, provocation excuses if and because the actor, as a
result of provocation, suffers a total, though temporary, loss of capacity to
control his conduct and conform to the law's demands. According to the
partial-incapacity theory, the provocation confronting the actor does not
cause a total loss of capacity for self-control, but it does cause a partial loss,
which suffices to mitigate murder to manslaughter.
(suggesting that "loss of self-control" may be a "clumsy way of reflecting that the defendant was
no longer responsive to the reasons that she was ordinarily motivated by"). Likewise, if the
desire to kill truly is an alien desire, then a full excuse would seem to be in order, much like a
full excuse would seem to be in order in cases involving coercive indoctrination or
brainwashing, assuming such cases warrant any excuse. But cf id. at 507 n.34 (purporting to
offer an explanation for the partiality requirement).
According to the third version of the character theory, an actor is excused, not
because he acts in any sense "out of character," but because, on the contrary, he lives up to some
applicable norm of character. See Gardner, supra, at 578. In my view, this form of character
theory is one way of fleshing out the unfair-opportunity branch of the orthodox choice theory.
See Garvey. supra note 24, at 286-87. If an actor who breaks the law nonetheless acts as he is
permitted to act pursuant to some other norm to which the law defers (including what might be
described as norms of character), then the actor's opportunity to comply with the law was
"unfair," and the law grants him a full excuse, ft so, then the unfair-opportunity branch of the
choice theory of excuse is really a form of justification. The actor's conduct is impermissible
according to the law's own norms; consequently, the actor is not entitled to a "standard"
justification, such as self-defense. Nonetheless, the actor's conduct was permissible according to
some other system of norms to which the law condescends or defers. This condescension or
deference takes the form of an "excuse." For more on this theory and why it cannot solve
passion's puzzle, see infra pp. 1717-26.
70. Because the excuse-based theories examined below focus on an actor's failure to
conform to the law, they all involve some problem with the actor's volition (his capacity and fair
opportunity to conform his conduct to the law), not some problem with his cognition (his
capacity and fair opportunity to know what the law requires).
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a. Total Incapacity
According to the total-incapacity theory, provocation excuses an actor if
and because, as a result of provocation, he experiences a desire to kill his
provocateur; moreover, the actor's capacity to control this desire is at the
same time rendered completely but temporarily disabled.7
The total-incapacity theory can readily explain the passion requirement.
The heat of passion (anger) arising from the provocation constitutes,
generates, or intensifies a desire to kill strong or intense enough to be
completely but temporarily beyond the actor's ability to control it.72 Perhaps
the actor cannot control the desire to kill because the desire bypasses his will
altogether. The desire acts on its own, so to speak, without any intervening
act of will, causing the fatal movement of the actor's body. In other words,
one might say, the actor's body moved, but he did not move it. The total-
incapacity theory therefore analogizes the provoked actor's bodily
movement to that of a reflex, or the provoked actor himself to an
automaton, or perhaps to one who is insane, acting under the influence of
an "irresistible impulse" attributable to mental disease or defect.7"
The theory can likewise explain the reasonable loss of self-control
requirement. If a desire is strong or intense enough to be beyond an actor's
capacity to control it, it would a fortiori be unreasonable to expect such
control. Ought implies can, and insofar as an actor is caught in the grip of a
desire he truly cannot control no matter how hard he tries or were to try,
such control cannot reasonably be expected of him.74
The theory does less well when it comes to explaining the adequate-
provocation and partiality requirements. Because it focuses on the strength
71. See, e.g., Dressier, Heat of Passion, supra note 21, at 465-66 (discussing this theory).
72. The ontology of the emotions and their relationship to desire is an exceptionally
complicated and controversial philosophical question. See sources cited infra notes 130-42. I will
for present purposes simply assume a particular emotion can be analyzed into an associated
constellation of beliefs (the emotion's cognitive element), desires or passions (its conative
element), and feeling or "heat" (its affective element).
73. One might fairly claim that no desire is literally irresistible. Desires not resisted exist,
but irresistible desires do not. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 36, at 357 (arguing that one can
"plausibl[y]" characterize some desires as irresistible but believing it "more accurate to say" that
such putative desires excuse on the basis of "some theory of psychological compulsion" or
"rationality defect"). If irresistible desires do indeed turn out not to exist, so much the worse for
the total-incapacity theory. My aim here, however, is to explain the total-incapacity theory, not
to defend it. For an effort to explain what it means to say an impulse or desire is irresistible
without making any claims as to the existence of any such impulses or desires, see Michael
Smith, Irresistible Impulse, in INTENTION IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 37 (Ngaire Naffine et al. eds.,
2001). See also ALFRED R. MELE, SPRINGS OF ACTION 97-99 (1992).
74. It would probably be more precise to say that this explanation of the reasonable loss of
self-control requirement explains why it would be unreasonable to expect self-control, not why
the actor's loss of self-control is reasonable. If so, then the total-incapacity theory adopts a
substitution strategy for dealing with the reasonable loss of self-control requirement. See supra
note 35.
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or intensity of the actor's desire to kill, and not on the reason why the actor
finds himself gripped with that desire in the first place, the theory cannot
explain why the doctrine insists on adequate provocation. If what really
matters is the existence of a desire strong enough to totally disable the
actor's capacity for self-control, then any provocation generating such a
desire should suffice, adequate or inadequate. Indeed, if all that matters is
the desire's intensity, then the genesis of the desire is irrelevant, provided
the actor is not responsible or to blame for its genesis. If so, then the total-
incapacity theory not only fails to explain why the provocation facing an
actor must be adequate, it also fails to explain why any provocation is
required.75
Likewise, the total-incapacity theory cannot explain the partiality
requirement. Insofar as the theory sees the provoked actor in the same light
as one whose body moves on reflex, who is an automaton, or who is
temporarily insane as a result of an irresistible impulse, it should provide
him with a complete defense. An actor who causes harm on reflex or
functions as an automaton is, and should be, free from any consequent
criminal liability. He does not act in the sense required for criminal
liability. 76 Similarly, an actor who commits a crime as a result of an
irresistible impulse due to mental disease or defect should be free from
criminal liability, since he is (on one definition) insane. 77 If the provoked
actor belongs to the same family as these actors, as the total-incapacity
theory implies, then the law should afford him a full defense, just as it does
the rest of his family.78
75. The total-incapacity theory could explain the adequate-provocation requirement if it
were to say an actor is responsible for his irresistible desire to kill when the desire arises from
inadequate provocation, but not when it arises from adequate provocation. But explaining the
adequate-provocation requirement in this way would commit the theory to imposing
punishment on the inadequately provoked actor not for what he has done, but for who he is
(for his character). See infra pp. 1710-26.
76. See DRESSLER, supra note 17, § 9.02[C] [2], at 85-86 (explaining the voluntary act
requirement).
77. Many jurisdictions today do not recognize "irresistible impulses" due to mental disease
or defect as a basis for a plea of insanity. See 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES
§ 173(e) (1), at 68 (Supp. 2004-05). The basis for rejecting such a defense appears primarily to
he skepticism as to the existence of such impulses or desires. If such impulses or desire do exist,
then a jurisdiction's refusal to recognize an "irresistible impulse" test of insanity must be
defended on grounds of optimal error allocation. For example, insofar as it is very difficult to
tell if a particular actor did indeed act on the basis of an irresistible impulse, a system without
an irresistible-impulse defense will, on the one hand, never risk erroneously acquitting an actor
who claimed to have suffered from such an impulse, but who in fact did not. On the other
hand, such a system will risk convicting actors who did suffer from such an impulse and who
should therefore be acquitted. The question then becomes one of balancing the respective
costs and benefits of a system without the defense compared to one with it. See United States v.
Lyons, 739 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1984) (Rubin, J., dissenting) (arguing that the balance
should be struck in favor of continued retention of a volition-based test for insanity).
78. See, e.g., ASHWORTH, supra note 17, § 6.5 (a), at 231-32. As Ashworth notes:
1702 [2005]
HeinOnline -- 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1702 2004-2005
PASSION'S PUZZLE 1703
b. Partial Incapacity
The partial-incapacity theory can be seen as an effort to redress the
failure of the total-incapacity theory to explain the partiality requirement.79
Like the total-incapacity theory, the partial-incapacity theory focuses on the
strength or intensity of the provoked actor's desire to kill arising from the
provocation. But whereas the total-incapacity theory says that the provoked
actor's loss of capacity to control the desire is and must be complete, the
partial-incapacity theory (true to its name) says that the loss of capacity is
and need only be partial.80 And because the provoked actor's capacity for
self-control is only partially impaired, the defense to which he is entitled is
only partial. The partial-incapacity theory therefore provides a facially
plausible explanation for the partiality requirement.
8
'
[I]t is not difficult to conceive of conditions of extreme rage in which a person
would find it virtually impossible to control his actions .... Probably there is
enough in the argument that loss of self-control may occasionally negative mens rea
or voluntariness to suggest that its claim to be treated as a complete defence
should be considered seriously.
Id.; see also HORDER, supra note 16, at 119 ("[l]t is not clear why, if anger does indeed take the
form of irresistible impulse, a complete acquittal is not the result that should of necessity
follow."); Dressier, Difficult Subject, supra note 21, at 974 ("If [the provoked actor] were totally
incapable, afullexcuse would be defensible."); Dressier, Heat of Passion, supra note 21, at 465-66
("If the provocation was so great that it would probably cause the ordinary, law-abiding person
to wholly lose his ability to control himself, then ... the provocation should wholly, not just
partially, excuse the actor."). Some cases ostensibly falling under the heading of duress might
also "operate rather like insanity as an excuse." R.A. Duff, Rule-Violations and Wrongdoings, in
CRIMINAL LAw THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 47, 64 (Stephen Shute & A.P.
Simester eds., 2002).
79. Joshua Dressler is the foremost proponent of the partial-incapacity theory. See sources
cited supra note 21. According to Dressier, provocation is based on the incapacity branch of the
choice theory of excuse, in contrast to duress, which is based on the unfair opportunity branch.
See Dressier, Difficult Subject, supra note 21, at 974 n.68. Although Dressier recognizes that
"[tihere are similarities between provocation and duress," id at 975 n.68, he nonetheless
ultimately rejects the analogy, preferring instead the analogy to insanity. See id. ("In duress
cases, we sense that the coerced party chooses to accede to the coercer's threat; it is in a real
sense a rational albeit perhaps socially unjustifiable, choice.... In contrast, with provocation,
the killing is the result of an emotional explosion... [, which] is the antithesis of rationality."
(emphasis added)).
80. See Dressler, Difficult Subject, supra note 21, at 974 ("[T]he [provoked actor's] loss of
self-control is not totally excusable, because the law's assumption is that the provoked party was
not wholly incapable of controlling or channeling his anger."); Dressier, Heat of Passion, supra
note 21, at 466 ("Heat of passion only makes sense as a partial excuse when the jury can say that
the ordinarily law-abiding person would have become so sufficiently angry that he would have
been unable to fully control his anger."); Dressier, Provocation, supra note 21, at 472 ("[T]he
provocation plea represents ... a 'barely could' [exercise self-control] claim by a criminal
defendant.").
81. But see infra pp. 1704-05 (questioning the coherence of the idea of a partial incapacity
to conform one's conduct to the requirements of law).
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The partial-incapacity theory can also explain the reasonable loss of self-
control and passion requirements, offering much the same explanations as
does the total-incapacity theory. The heat of passion is needed because it
constitutes, generates, or intensifies a desire to kill in response to the
provocation strong or intense enough to render the actor partially incapable
of controlling it. Likewise, expecting or demanding an actor to control such
a desire would be unreasonable. 82 The provoked actor's failure to exercise
self-control is, if not reasonable, at least not unreasonable insofar as it results
from a partial disabling of his capacity for such control, which is itself the
result of an intense provocation-induced desire.
In the end, the only real difference between the total- and partial-
incapacity theories is the extent to which the provoked actor's capacity for
self-control is said to be impaired. The total-incapacity theory, insisting as it
does on total impairment, portrays the provoked killer as having acted on
reflex, or as an automaton, or as being temporarily insane, killing as a result
of an irresistible impulse. The partial-incapacity theory also portrays the
provoked killer as temporarily insane, not because he kills out of an
irresistible impulse, but rather because he momentarily lacks, as the MPC's
definition of insanity would describe it, the "substantial capacity... to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
84
The partial-incapacity theory is an improvement over the total-
incapacity theory. Nonetheless, like the total-incapacity theory, the partial-
incapacity theory cannot explain the adequate-provocation requirement.
Again, the strength or intensity of the actor's desire is the linchpin of the
theory. As such, it doesn't matter why the actor finds himself so gripped,
provided of course that the actor himself is not at fault or to blame for being
82. As with the total-incapacity theory, the partial-incapacity theory's explanation for the
reasonable loss of self-control requirement is really an explanation for why such a loss of self-
control is not unreasonable, as opposed to an explanation for its being reasonable. See supra
note 35. Dressier himself does not adopt this strategy for explaining the reasonable loss of self-
control requirement. His preferred strategy for dealing with the unacceptable implications of a
robust reading of the reasonable loss of self-control requirement is instead to substitute the
"ordinary person" for the "reasonable person," although he believes the terms can be used
interchangeably. See, e.g., Dressier, Difficult Subject, supra note 21, at 973 n.65.
83. See, e.g., Dressler, Heat ofPassion, supra note 21, at 463 ("In provocation cases... the
involuntariness resulting from anger is like insanity, not duress."); see also Dressier, Difficult
Subject, supra note 21, at 975 n.68 ("[W] ith provocation, the killing is the result of an emotional
explosion almost immediately following the provocation. The homicidal act here is the
antithesis of rationality.").
84. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1985). Inasmuch as the partial-incapacity theory
analogizes the provoked actor to an actor who satisfies the excusing condition contained in the
MPC's definition of insanity, it would seem to follow, despite the partial-incapacity theory's
emphasis on the partial nature of the provoked actor's incapacity, that provocation should be a
complete defense, just as insanity so defined is a complete defense.
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so gripped.85 If so, then it doesn't matter whether the provocation causing
the desire is adequate or inadequate. Indeed, it doesn't matter if
provocation or something else entirely is its cause."
Moreover, even if the partial-incapacity theory could explain the
adequate-provocation requirement, it has another problem. The theory is
based on the concept of "partial incapacity." The provoked actor is entitled
to mitigation because he is partially unable to control the desire to kill
arising from the provocation. But the idea of a partial incapacity is
incoherent."7 With respect to any particular task at any particular point in
time an actor either does or does not have the capacity to accomplish the
task. The logic of capacity is an all-or-nothing logic. Either I can q, or I can't
(p. It may be harder or more difficult for one actor who has the capacity to 9#
actually to succeed in (p-ing compared to another actor who has the same
capacity."" Nonetheless, both actors ex hypothesi have the capacity to p, no
matter how hard they find it to exercise that capacity at a given moment in
time.s 9
85. As with the total-incapacity theory, the partial-incapacity theory could explain the
adequate-provocation requirement if it were to say that an actor is responsible for his partially
incapacitating desire to kill when the desire arises from inadequate provocation, but not when
it arises from adequate provocation. But again, such an explanation would commit the theory
to imposing punishment on the inadequately provoked actor not for what he has done, but for
who he is (for his character). See infta pp. 1711-17.
86. Dressier favored abandoning the adequate-provocation requirement in his early
writings. See Dressier, Provocation, supra note 21, at 475 n.46 ("I would.., not require evidence
of wrongful conduct [i.e., adequate provocation] as a prerequisite to finding manslaughter.").
In his most recent writing, however, he says that the doctrine May but need not include a
requirement of adequate provocation. See Dressier, Difficult Subject, supra note 21, at 972
(describing the heat-of-passion doctrine as "potentially" containing "a Justificatory' feature"
reflected in the adequate-provocation requirement); id. at 984 (" [I] t is perfectly appropriate to
limit the partial defense to those whose lack of self-control is the result of adequate provocation
and not just an) provocation."). But if the adequate-provocation requirement is treated as an
optional feature of the doctrine, the question still remains: What role does the requirement
play if and when the option is exercised and adequate provocation is required in order for an
actor to prevail on a plea of provocation?
87. Insofar as the doctrine of diminished capacity also rests on the idea of a partial
incapacity, it too seems to me to be incoherent. See infra pp. 1738-44 (discussing diminished
capacity doctrine).
88. The fact that it may be harder for an actor to exercise his capacity for self-control can
help explain why any such effort on his part failed on the present occasion. It can also lend
credence to an actor's claim to have tried to exercise self-control but to have failed successfully
to do so on the present occasion.
89. An actor's capacity for self-control is probably best understood as consisting of a
variety of learned skills of self-control, including what might be called "brute resistance," which
consists in forming or retaining an intention to do that which one believes one ought to do. In
other words, the intentional formation of the intention to do that which one believes one ought
to do ultimately alters the balance of one's desires in favor of doing that which one believes one
ought to do. See MELE, supra note 25, at 58 ("A person's capacity for self-control is a function of
the modes of skilled resistance ... and his powers of brute resistance."); Holton & Shute, supra
note 28, at 7 ("[Tlhere is a distinct faculty of self-control that enables agents to do what they
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2. Unfair Opportunity
According to the unfair-opportunity theory, an actor who kills in the
heat of passion upon adequate provocation is entitled to a partial defense,
not because the desire to kill resulting from the provocation renders him
totally or partially incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements
of law, but rather because expecting such conformity would be unfair. It
would be too much to demand of him under the circumstances.90
judge best in the face of strong inclinations to the contrary; and... this faculty standardly works
0 by employing prior resolutions."); Robert C. Roberts, Will Power and the Virtues, 93 PHIL. REV.
227, 227 (1984) ("[Olne group of virtues, which might be called the moral strengths or virtues
of will power, are to a large extent skill-like.").
Inasmuch as an actor's capacity for self-control does indeed consist of such skills, an
actor's capacity for self-control might intelligibly -be described as partial or diminished in a
comparative sense. One actor might have available to him at any given moment fewer of the
relevant skills compared to another actor. As such, it may be harder or more difficult for the
first actor successfully to exercise self-control compared to the second. The first actor therefore
labors, one might say, under diminished capacities for self-control compared to the second. Still,
at any particular point in time an actor either will or will not have the requisite capacity for self-
control such that he either is or is not able to conform his conduct to the requirements of law,
assuming he cares enough to fully deploy whatever skills of self-control he has available to him.
90. Duress has been described as an excuse best explained by the unfair-opportunity
branch of the choice theory of excuse. See, e.g., Joshua Dressier, ReJlections on Excusing
Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 710 (1988)
("Duress is a no-fair-opportunity excuse."). Unfair-opportunity theories of provocation tend to
analogize provocation to duress, much like incapacity theories tend to analogize it to insanity.
But the analogy between provocation and duress ultimately breaks down, as does the analogy
between provocation and insanity. When duress excuses an actor for failing to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law, it does so ultimately because, as the MPC puts it, the actor
has acted as would a person of "reasonable firmness" or fortitude in the same situation. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1985). According to the MPC:
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged...
because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force
against his person or the person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness
in his situation would have been unable to resist.
Id. An actor who violates the law due to duress is therefore excused insofar as he is in fact
permitted to act (justified in acting) as he does, not in the eyes of the law, but in the eyes of
some competing system of norms incorporated into the criminal law by reference to the
.person of reasonable firmness." Consequently, while a standard case of duress constitutes an
"excuse" in the eyes of the law, it constitutes a 'justification" in the eyes of some other
normative system to which the law gives recognition.
The claim that duress is in fact some form of justification is quite common in the
literature. See, e.g., ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 168 (1987) (duress as "agent-relative"
justification); Larry Alexander, A Unied Excuse of Preemptive Setf-Protection, 74 NOTRE DAME L
REV. 1475, 1487 (1999) (duress as "personal" justification); Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress: A
Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law, 37 ARiZ. L. REv. 251, 280 (1995) (duress as "agent-
relative" justification); Moore, supra note 69, at 40 (unfair-opportunity branch of choice theory
of excuse "could be called the 'failed justification' idea of excuse"); Robert F. Schopp,
Justification Defenses and Just Convictions, 24 PAC. L.J. 1233, 1311 (1993) (duress as justification
under "conventional social morality"); see also R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL
SENTIMENIS 144 (1994) (arguing that cases of duress are cases in which the "agent has not
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The unfair-opportunity theory can take one of two forms. The first, like
the incapacity theories, focuses on the strength or intensity of the provoked
actor's desire to kill. On this account, the provoked actor faces an unfair
opportunity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law if and
because a reasonable person in the grip of a desire to kill as intense as that
of the provoked actor would have found it especially hard to conform, even
though the actor did not lack (or partially lack) the capacity to conform.
The unfair-opportunity theory in this form can account for the passion
and reasonable loss of self-control requirements. As with the incapacity
theories, the heat of passion is required because it constitutes, generates, or
intensifies the actor's desire to kill. Likewise, the actor is entitled to the
defense if and only if his failure to exercise his capacity for self-control in the
face of a desire so intense is reasonable inasmuch as a person of reasonable
firmness would likewise have failed to resist so intense a desire.
Unfortunately, this first form of the unfair-opportunity theory, like the
total-incapacity theory, cannot account for the partiality or adequate-
provocation requirements. If a reasonable person experiencing a desire to
kill as strong or intense as that of the provoked actor would have killed
because he would have failed to control that desire, then the provoked
actor, having acted reasonably or in the same way a reasonable person would
really violated the moral obligations that we accept"); Craig L. Carr, Duress and Criminal
Responsibility, 10 LAw & PHIL. 161, 183 (1991) (arguing that duress provides a defense in "those
extraordinary cases that involve disobedience to law in response to a moral dilemma"); Joshua
Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1331, 1366 (1989) ("At its core, the defense of duress requires us to determine
what conduct we, a society of individual members of the human race, may legitimately expect of
our fellow threatened humans."); Gardner, supra note 69, at 597-98 (arguing that the "gist of
an excuse," including that of duress, is that one has "lived up to" the 'applicable standards of
character" based on some conception of one's appropriate role); Morse, supra note 36, at 341
("Deciding which choices are too hard, that is, which threats might cause a person of
reasonable firmness to yield and to do wrong [and thus be excused on the basis of duress], is of
course a normative matter." (emphasis added)). But see Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The
Criminal Defense of Duress: Ajustification, Not an Excuse-And Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv.
833, 914 (2003) (arguing that an actor who validly claims duress is justified in the eyes of the
law because he has "conformed to what the law ultimately regards as minimally acceptable
conduct" (emphasis added)). For a brief but effective critique of the Westen-Mangiafico thesis,
see Berman, supra note 18, at 72-73.
Insofar as killing under adequate provocation is permissible neither in the eyes of the
law nor in the eyes of any competing system of norms to which the law is prepared to pay
deference, the analogy between valid claims of duress and valid claims of provocation breaks
down, If a competing system of norms to which the law was prepared to pay deference did
permit an actor to kill upon adequate provocation, then provocation would be analogous to
standard cases of duress. Under those circumstances, however, provocation, like duress, should
be a full excuse. Some commentators who appear to analogize provocation to duress fail to
explain why the latter is, but the former is not, a full excuse. See, e.g., Macklem & Gardner, supra
note 22, at 824-26 (arguing that the reasonable loss of self-control requirement should vary
depending on the role the actor occupies, but failing to explain why an actor who lives up to
the relevant standard should not therefore be fully excused).
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have acted, should be entitled to a full excuse, not a partial one. 9' The law
should not punish people for reasonable failures. Similarly, insofar as it
focuses on the strength or intensity of the desire to kill, without regard to
the reasons why the actor found himself gripped with such a desire, neither
can the unfair-opportunity theory in this form account for the adequate-
provocation requirement. If what matters is the strength or intensity of the
actor's desire to kill, why he so desires is neither here nor there.
In contrast, the second form of the unfair-opportunity theory does care
about why the actor wants to kill. On this account, a provoked actor faces an
unfair opportunity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law if and
because a reasonable person would have gotten angry at that which made
the actor angry. Moreover, that anger would have constituted, generated, or
intensified a desire to kill that a reasonable person would have failed to
control.
This second form of the unfair-opportunity theory can arguably explain
three of the doctrine's four requirements. The heat of passion is needed
because it constitutes, generates, or intensifies the provoked actor's desire to
kill. The adequate-provocation requirement is needed because an actor's
opportunity to conform his conduct to the law is unfair if and only if the
provocation he faced was adequate. 'Finally, the reasonable loss of self-
control requirement is needed because it identifies when an alleged
provocation constitutes adequate provocation. An alleged provocation is
adequate if and only if a reasonable person faced with such provocation
would have become so angry as to have lost self-control.
92
Nonetheless, the theory has two problems. First, it leaves the partiality
requirement unexplained. If the adequately provoked actor's loss of self-
control really was reasonable, then he should be entitled to a full defense.
Second, and more ominously, it ends up punishing some provoked actors
not only for the character of their action, but also for the makeup of their
character. In other words, it ends up punishing some provoked actors not
only for what they do, but also for who they are. But punishing people for
who they are, and not only for what they do, is an illegitimate end for the
criminal law of a liberal state. Let me elaborate.
According to the second form of the unfair-opportunity theory, the only
difference between an actor who loses self-control and kills in the heat of
passion upon adequate provocation and an actor who loses self-control and
kills in the heat of passion upon inadequate provocation is the adequacy of
the provocation each of them confronts. Both actors kill only because they
fail to control a provocation-induced desire to kill, even though each is
91. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 35.
92. Because the second form of the unfair-opportunity theory defines adequate
provocation in terms of reasonable loss of self-control (and vice versa) the theory in effect
embraces a consolidation strategy for dealing with the reasonable loss of self-control
requirement. See supra note 35.
[2005]1708
HeinOnline -- 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1708 2004-2005
PASSION'S PUZZLE
assumed to be fully capable of exercising such control. Nonetheless, the
adequately provoked actor's failure to exercise self-control is deemed
reasonable, whereas the inadequately provoked actor's failure is deemed
unreasonable. The adequately provoked actor is therefore convicted of
manslaughter, whereas the inadequately provoked actor is convicted of
murder.
Now, if the adequately provoked actor and the inadequately provoked
actor, unlike the unprovoked actor, kill only because they lose self-control in
the face of provocation, and if the adequately provoked actor's claim to
mitigation ultimately rests on his claim to have killed only because he lost
self-control, then why is the inadequately provoked actor, who also killed
only because he lost self-control, denied the chance to make the same claim?
The answer is this: The inadequately provoked actor forfeits his claim to
mitigation-a claim to which he would otherwise have been entitled-
because and only because he got angry for the wrong reasons. The adequate-
provocation requirement therefore functions as a forfeiture rule. An actor who
kills only because he loses self-control in the face of inadequate provocation
should not have gotten angry in the first place, and the price he pays for his
misplaced anger is to forfeit his claim to the defense.
Such forfeiture rules are well-known, though not uncontroversial,
features of the criminal law. According to these rules, an actor who would
otherwise have a valid defense (justification, excuse, or failure of proof) to a
crime forfeits the defense (completely or partially) if he is culpably
responsible for creating the conditions giving rise to it.93 For example, an
actor who voluntarily becomes intoxicated might forfeit a claim to the effect
that he could not or did not, as a result thereof, form a mental state
required for conviction.94 Likewise, an actor who kills in self-defense, but
who started the fray, forfeits any claim to self-defense, unless he successfully
renounces his initial aggression.95 So too, an actor who places himself in a
situation in which he knows he will likely be coerced to commit a crime
forfeits any claim of duress.96 Indeed, an actor who intentionally provokes
conduct that in turn provokes him to lose self-control and kill forfeits any
claim of provocation . All of these actors are in some fashion responsible
93. The details of these forfeiture rules vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See Paul H.
Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One ' Own Defense. A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal
Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REv. 1, 2-27 (1985) (surveying then-existing approaches to "cases where
an actor is in some way responsible for bringing about the conditions of his own defense"). The
differences are not important for present purposes. In place of such forfeiture rules, Robinson
proposes to "maintain[I the defense for the offense conduct but impos[e] liability for conduct
in causing the defense conditions." Id. at 27 (capitalization altered).
94. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (1985).
95. See, e.g., id. § 3.04(2)(b)(i).
96. See, e.g., id. § 2.09(2).
97. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a), at 64-65 (1980) (noting that it is
"implicit" in the MPC formulation of the defense that "extreme emotional disturbance will not
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for getting themselves into trouble. They all have "dirty hands," as a result of
which the law denies them a defense to which they would otherwise have
been entitled.
The second form of the unfair-opportunity theory treats the adequate
provocation requirement as another example of such forfeiture rules.98 An
actor who fails to exercise self-control in the face of inadequate provocation
forfeits any claim of provocation because he became angry when a
reasonable person would not have. But if the adequate provocation
requirement is treated as a forfeiture rule, then the punishment imposed on
an inadequately provoked actor for murder, above and beyond that which
he would have received had he been convicted of manslaughter, is
punishment imposedjust because he has, so to speak, a "dirty character."
According to the second form of the unfair-opportunity theory, an
adequately provoked actor's claim to excuse is ultimately based on the
simple fact that he failed to control a provocation-induced desire to kill. But
an inadequately provoked actor can make the same claim. The inadequately
provoked actor, like the adequately provoked actor, honestly believes the
provocation facing him constitutes a serious wrong, which in turn triggers a
passion-induced or -enhanced desire to kill. If so, then the only difference
between the adequately provoked actor and the inadequately provoked
actor ultimately lies in their respective beliefs as to the kinds of actions that
constitute instances of serious wrongdoing.
Whereas the adequately provoked actor's beliefs are true or appropriate
(according to some system of norms), those of the inadequately provoked
actor are false or inappropriate (according to some system of norms). The
reduce murder to manslaughter if the actor has intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or
negligently brought about his own mental disturbance"); ASHWORTH, supra note 17, §
7A(b) (ii), at 273 (noting that the effect, if any, of self-induced provocation on an actor's claim
of provocation is a question left to the jury under section 3 of the 1957 Homicide Act); AJ.
Ashworth, Self-Induced Provocation and the Homicide Act, 1973 CRIM. L. REv. 483, 484-87
(discussing common law authorities). Some state statutes expressly provide that any provocation
induced by the actor is inadequate as a matter of law. See, e.g., State v. Pulsifer, 724 A.2d 1234,
1238 (Me. 1999) (describing Maine law).
98. See, e.g., Ashworth, supra note 22, at 308 ("The defence of provocation implies that the
loss of self-control was caused by the provocation: if the provocation was objectively slight, this
suggests that the substantial cause of the loss of control was not the provocation but rather
some weakness (or wickedness) in the accused's character." (emphasis added)); id. at 311
("[Tlhe primary rationale of the objective standard is that it declares the widely-felt distinction
between someone who is tnly provoked to kill ... , and someone upon whose personality a
relatively trivial provocation reacts in a disproportionate way." (emphasis added)); ef Dressier,
Provocation, supra note 21, at 474-75 (describing how the adequate-provocation requirement
could be explained on the basis of an analogy to the forfeiture rule governing voluntary
intoxication). According to Horder, the explanation Ashworth and Dressler offer or suggest for
the existence of the adequate-provocation requirement means that "[d]efendants in [cases of
inadequate provocation] are properly given no mitigation of the offence, because the loss of
self-control ultimately steins from something for which they are 'to blame', namely, their
defective character." HORDER, supra note 16, at 123 (emphasis added).
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inadequately provoked actor therefore forfeits the defense, not because he
acts with any more culpability than does the adequately provoked actor, but
simply because he believes culpably. Moreover, if one's beliefs are constituent
elements of one's character over which one has no direct or immediate
control," then the additional punishment imposed on the inadequately
provoked actor, who neither accepts nor otherwise identifies with the
offending belief, is punishment imposed for the content of his character,
not for the character of his action.'00
Comparing provocation with hate crimes might help clarify the point.
Hate crimes can be analyzed in two very different ways.' 0 ' First, hate crimes
99. One might claim an actor does have control over his beliefs and desires (and thus over
his character) because he chooses those beliefs and desires. As such, one might claim an actor
can be held responsible for his character on the same basis as he can be held responsible for his
actions. Despite the fact that Aristotle appears to have endorsed this claim, it nonetheless seems
to me implausible. We do not have the same degree of control via choice over our characters as
we do our actions. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 69, at 45 (doubting as an empirical matter that
"we really have much capacity to mold our characters"); see also George Sher, Ethics, Character,
and Action, 15 Soc. PHIL. & POLY 1, 9 (1998) ("It is, I think, mere wishful thinking to suppose
that anyone has much control over either his characteristic outlook on the world or his basic
mode of engaging with others."). For efforts to defend the Aristotlean thesis, see, for example,
JONATHAN JACOBS, CHOOSING CHARACTER: RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIRTUE AND VICE 1, 59 (2001),
claiming that "punitive sanctioning of... those who are ethically disabled (as a result of
voluntary activity)" and whose "characters are [therefore] such that sound ethical
considerations are inaccessible to them" is "permissible."
100. Treating the adequate-provocation requirement as a forfeiture rule also leaves the law
of homicide with no way to distinguish between actors who intentionally kill without losing self-
control from those who intentionally kill only because they lose self-control in the face of
inadequate provocation. See, e.g., Simons, supra note 61, at 426-27. Relying on the doctrine of
premeditation to distinguish between these two kinds of actors is not completely satisfying. The
idea would be that actors who intentionally kill without losing self-control would be guilty of
premeditated murder, whereas those who intentionally kill only because they lose self-control in
the face of inadequate provocation would be guilty of simple murder. But not all intentional
killers who kill without losing self-control premeditate, unless of course premeditation can be
satisfied based upon a finding of intent to kill, such that any actor who intentionally kills
without losing self-control can be found guilty of premeditated murder.
The premeditation doctrine is probably better understood as an awkward device
through which the law delegates to the jury the discretion to single out those intentional killers
who, in the jury's judgment, intentionally kill for especially reprehensible motives freely and
wholeheartedly acted upon. See, e.g., PILLSBURY, supra note 22, at 110 (urging that the motives
elevating murder to aggravated murder be spelled out in statute and including among them
"animosity toward the victim's race, religion, ethnicity, sex or sexual orientation"); Kahan &
Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 325 ("[Ilt is the quality of offenders' motives (or lack thereof), and
not the intensity or suddenness of them, that separates the most heinous iisurders from the
rest.").
101. See Kenneth W. Simons, Does Punishment for "Culpable Indifference" Simply Punish for "Bad
Character"?, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 219, 244-45 (2002) (distinguishing these two different ways in
which "[clriminal provisions authorizing enhanced punishment for bias crimes can reach" an
actor).
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can be analogized to crimes of specific intent. 10 2 On this view, an actor guilty
of a hate crime is punished more severely than an otherwise-motivated actor
because he commits the crime with a specific intent (understood as a motive
or desire) to humiliate or subordinate the victim, which motive or desire is
triggered because the actor believes, 03 based solely on the victim's group
membership, that the victim is inherently evil.'0 4
A hate crime so understood does not enhance an actor's punishment
simply because he happens to reveal in action his possession of the
proscribed desire and the belief triggering it. Instead, his punishment is
enhanced if and because his action reveals his acceptance of or
102. For analyses of hate crimes along these lines, see, for example, Kent Greenawalt,
Reflections on Justifications for Defining Crimes by the Category of Victim, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
617, 620-25; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Bias Crimes: What Do Haters Deserve?, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS,
Summer/Fall 1992, at 20, 21; Paul H. Robinson, flate Crime: Crime of Motive, Character, or Group
Terror?, 1992/1993 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 605, 606-09.
However, according to the recent analysis of Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore, hate
crimes cannot plausibly be analogized to crimes of specific intent because "to explain a
defendant's action as a product of hatred is not itself to attribute to him a desire to bring about
some future state of affairs," as is true of specific-intent crimes. Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S.
Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prjudice, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1122 (2004); see also Heidi M.
Hurd, Why Liberals Should Hate "Hate Crime Legislation," 20 LAW & PHIL. 215, 219-22 (2001)
(earlier work defending the same claim). If I understand this argument correctly, I find it
unpersuasive. Why can't an actor guilty of a hate crime be understood to desire to bring about a
future state of affairs in which the victim is humiliated or subordinated?
Hurd and Moore also appear to argue that portraying hate crimes as crimes of specific
intent nisdescribes what hate crimes are all about. Committing a crime against a person
because you hate him simply cannot be reduced, so the argument goes, to committing a crime
against him because yot want to humiliate or subordinate him. Ifa hate crime is a crime of hate
it must necessarily include the feeling or affectivity associated with the emotion of hate. See
Hurd & Moore, supra, at 1126. Thus, they claim, a hate crime is necessarily one done, so to
speak, in the "heat of hate." It seems to me, however, that at least some proponerlts of hate-
crime legislation would be contented if such legislation defined a hate crime so as to include
hate crimes qua crimes of specific intent but to exclude hate crimes qua crimes of passion.
103. Some analysts argue that intentions can be wholly reduced to a complex of beliefs and
desires, see, e.g., Robert Audi, Intending, 70 J. PHIL, 387, 395 (1973), while others argue that
intentions cannot be so reduced. See, e.g., Michael Bratman, Two Faces of Intention, 93 PHIL. REV.
375,376 (1984).
104. Insofar as the emotion involved in provocation cases is anger while that involved in
hate crimes is hate, the difference between these two emotions has been characterized as
follows: "Anger is aroused in response to a specific, undeserved offense," while "hate may be
characterized as involving a global negative attitude toward someone considered to possess
fundamentally evil traits." BEN-ZE'EV, supra note 34, at 380; see also ELSTER, supra note 34, at 65
("In anger, my hostility is directed towards another's actions and can be extinguished by getting
even.... In hatred, my hostility is directed toward another person or a category of individuals
who are seen as intrinsically and irremediably bad."). In any event, if illegitimate or unjustified
hatred is not limited to hate based on group membership, Anthony Dillof makes a fair point
when he says: "[T]he problem with attempting to justify bias crime statutes on a theory of
greater culpability is that to the extent that greater punishments are warranted in eases of racial
animus, it is because of the 'animus,' not the 'racial.'" Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An
Examination of the Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1015, 1077
(1997).
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identification with that desire, which implies his acceptance of or
identification with its triggering belief. Hate crimes qua specific-intent
crimes can therefore be said to punish an actor's choice to express the
proscribed desire and belief in action, not simply his possession of such
desire and belief. As such, they punish choice, not character. Consequently,
hate crimes qua specific-intent crimes cannot fairly be indicted on the
charge that they punish character.'
°5
Second, hate crimes can be analogized to crimes of passion. 10 6 On this
view, an actor guilty of a hate crime does not wholeheartedly choose to
express his hate in action. He does not accept the desire to humiliate or
subordinate associated with his hate, nor does he therefore choose to
express that desire or its triggering belief in action. His desire and belief are
but-for causes of his action, but they are not, so it might be put, motives for
his action. 10 7 Instead, the proscribed desire and belief simply "attend" his
action.'0 8 They constitute a desire and belief he "harbor[s]" while acting. '09
Consequently, hate crimes qua crimes of passion, unlike hate crimes qua
crimes of specific intent, do punish an actor for his character.
Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore argue that hate crimes qua crimes of
passion are objectionable precisely because the additional punishment
imposed on the hate criminal, above and beyond the punishment imposed
on his non-hate counterpart, is punishment imposed on him for having a
bad character, or in other words, for possessing proscribed desires and
105. The worthy-motive theory of provocation can be understood as an effort to construe
the provocation doctrine as defining an unusual type of specific-intent crime. According to the
worthy-motive theory, the adequately provoked actor is free to act wholeheartedly on his desire
to retaliate in response to the provocateur's wrongdoing, and because the law deems this desire
(or inotive) a relatively worthy one, he is guilty of a lesser crime than murder. Thus, whereas
the adequately provoked actor wholeheartedly acts on the basis of a relatively worthy motive for
which his punishment is mitigated, the actor guilty of a hate crime qua crime of specific intent
wholeheartedly acts on the basis of an especially unworthy motive for which his punishment is
aggravated. Again, however, the worthy-motive theory is inadequate as an explanatory theory of
provocation insofar as it cannot explain the passion and reasonable loss of self-control
requirements. See supra pp. 1693-95.
106. For Hurd and Moore, this second way of understanding hate crimes is the only
plausible way to understand them. According to Hurd and Moore, "to explain a defendant's
action as a product of hatred is... to characterize his action as a product of a particular passion
within which he was gripped at the time." Hurd & Moore, supra note 102, at 1122 (emphasis added).
It should be apparent that the language Hurd and Moore use to characterize hate crimes is
language typically associated with the provocation doctrine. Hurd and Moore recognize the
close relationship between the provocation doctrine and hate crimes qua crimes of passion. See
id. at 1120 n.110 ("Inasmuch as the provocation/passion doctrine is concerned with an
emotional state within which a defendant acts, it is more like the mens rea doctrine of hate/bias
crimes than is any other doctrine in the criminal law.").
107. See Simons, supra note 101, at 244-47 (arguing that provocation cases and some hate
crimes cases involve "causal but nonmotivational desires").
108. Hurd & Moore, supranote 102, at 1118.
109. Id. at 1123.
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beliefs. 1 ° At the same time, however, Hurd and Moore find nothing
objectionable with the way in which the provocation doctrine mitigates an
actor's punishment based on his possession of worthy desires and beliefs. As
they see it, aggravation based on bad character is objectionable, but
mitigation based on good character is not.I1
Yet if an inadequately provoked actor, but for the inadequacy of the
provocation to which he responds, would otherwise be entitled to a
manslaughter conviction, then convicting him of murder is objectionable
for the same reason convicting the hate-crime killer is objectionable. In both
cases the proscribed desire and belief associated with the relevant emotion
attending the actor's conduct form the basis for increasing his punishment
above and beyond the punishment he would otherwise have received. In
neither case does the actor wholeheartedly act on the basis of the relevant
desires and beliefs. In both cases the actor is therefore punished for his bad
character. But imposing punishment for bad character is something a state
committed to liberal principles simply does not do.' 
2
Consider in this light Commonwealth v. Carr,"' one of the cases described
at the outset. The defendant in the case, described as a "mountain man,"
1 1 4
was on the Appalachian Trail in Adams County, Pennsylvania when he saw
two women making love. Claiming to have become enraged at the sight, he
shot the women with a .22-caliber rifle. One was killed, and the other
110. See id. at 1118-29.
111. See id. at 1120 n.l10 ("Inasmuch as the provocation/passion doctrine is... an
exculpatory doctrine, while the mens rea doctrine of hate/bias crimes is an inculpatory
doctrine, there is ultimately little analogy between the two .... ."). But see Simons, supra note
101, at 246 n.61 (claiming that this effort to distinguish provocation from hate crimes "fails to
explain why retributive theory canjustifiably recognize desires and emotional states only insofar
as they exculpate").
112. See, e.g., Hurd & Moore, supra note 102, at 1135 ("Character theories of punishment,"
which "best explain[] and justif[y]" hate crime legislation and "motivationally oriented
legislation in general.., cannot enjoy support from those who conceive of themselves as
working within the philosophical tradition of political liberalism."); Hurd, supra note 102, at
229 ("[T]he punishment of vice and the cultivation of virtue ... are distinctively non-liberal
goals."); Jeffrie G. Murphy, The State's Interest in Retribution, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 283,
297-98 (1994). As Murphy says:
If a person's [liberal] right of moral independence serves to block punishment
[directly for having an illiberal character], it is hard to see why it would not also
serve to block it at a later stage when the state seeks to impose, not simply the
punishment proper for the offense, but some additional punishment based on
[illiberal] motive or character.
Id. But cf Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of Hate Crime
Legislation Are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REv. 739, 742 (1999) ("Hate crimes legislation promotes a vision
of virtuous citizen character in a republic, a vision that requires us to condemn [through
punishment] the racist personality.").
113. 580 A.2d 1362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
114. POHLMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
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wounded.'1  Carr asserted provocation as a defense, but the trial judge
found him guilty of first-degree murder.116 His conviction was affirmed on
appeal. "The sight of naked women engaged in lesbian lovemaking," the
appeals court held, "is not adequate provocation. Indeed, such
provocation was inadequate as matter of law."18
The Carr case has become a cause c~l~bre among academic
commentators. The court's decision is widely seen as a victory for tolerance
and equality over "homophobic hatred."" 9 Yet the preceding analysis
suggests a different conclusion. If indeed Carr killed only because he failed
to exercise self-control, then any punishment imposed on him beyond the
punishment assigned to manslaughter would reflect punishment for his
holding or possessing the desires and beliefs associated with homophobic
hatred, or in other words, for being homophobic. If so, then while Carr may
be a victory for the liberal ends of tolerance and equality, it achieved any
such victory through decidedly illiberal means. It represents the exercise of
state coercion to punish a citizen partly for his character, illiberal though it
may be, and not only for his deeds.
12 0
115. See Carr, 580 A.2d at 1363. These are the bare-bone facts given in the reported opinion
of the Pennsylvania Superior Court on appeal. A more complete account of the facts and events
leading up to the crime can be found in POHLMAN, supra note 2. Insofar as Carr's putative claim
of provocation rested on his having killed while (using the language of the MPC) in a state of
"extreme mental disturbance," a state resulting from the sight of the women making love
combined with his abnormal "psychosexual history," his claim sounds more in diminished
capacity than it does provocation. Cf id. at 238 (describing Carr as a "social predator not fully in
touch with reality" (emphasis added)); Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and
Angry Young Men: Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 433, 483 (1994-95) (giving the victim's lawyer's description of Carr as having "some
sort of mental disability that, coupled with intense homophobia, exploded into homicidal
violence" (emphasis added)). However, diminished capacity was not then and is not now
available as an affirmative defense under Pennsylvania law, which only recognizes the defense in
its so-called mens rea variant. See Commonwealth v. Legg, 711 A.2d 430, 433 (Pa. 1998);
POHLMAN, supra note 2, at 102-03; see also infra note 191 (discussing two variants of diminished
capacity). In any event, if in fact Carr stalked the women and attacked them with the purpose or
desire of humiliating them, which purpose or desire he wholeheartedly embraced and made no
effort to resist, then far from being entitled to mitigation based on provocation, he would have
been guilty of a hate crime qua crime of specific intent.
116. Carr, 580 A.2d at 1363.
117. Id. at 1364.
118. Id.
119. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 313. I-low exactly to characterize the emotion in
which Carr acted is a matter of dispute. Carr's defense would no doubt have tried to
characterize it as "anger" at the "wrong" he believed the women were "committing" against him.
Nussbaum has characterized it as "disgust," an emotion she argues should never qualify as a
predicate for provocation. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME
AND THE LAW 130, 133 (2004).
120. Similar questions arise in which the alleged provocation is a non-violent homosexual
advance. A number of commentators have called for such advances to be treated as inadequate
provocation as a matter of law. See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 119, at 134 ("Because the
'reasonable man' is not simply the average man, but a normative social ideal, we should not
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If an actor willfully refuses to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law, the state can legitimately punish him for his defiance. But if an actor
finds himself saddled with an illiberal character, one composed of illiberal
beliefs and desires, and if he should be unlucky enough to lose self-control
and reveal, though not accept, his character's true colors in an otherwise
criminal act, punishing him for having such a character is an illiberal use of
state power.121 A liberal state can punish its citizens for the crimes they chose
to commit, but it cannot punish them more for the lack of virtue they
happen to betray in committing them, even when the virtues at stake are
liberal ones. If it does so punish its citizens, it betrays its own true-and
illiberal-character.
122
admit that gay-bashing disgust is ever the emotion of that hypothetical person."); Scott D.
McCoy, Note, The Homosexual-Advance Defense and Hate Crimes Statutes: Their Interaction and
Conflict, 22 CARDozo L. REv. 629, 661 (2001) ("[C]ourts should rule as a matter of law that a
nonviolent homosexual advance is not adequate provocation to reduce murder to
manslaughter."); Robert B. Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual
Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133, 136 (1992) ("J]udges should hold, as a
matter of law, that a homosexual advance is not sufficient provocation to incite a 'reasonable
man' to kill."). But see Dressier, Sexual Advance, supra note 21, at 729 ("[A] special rule
precluding the use of the provocation defense in homosexual advance (or, more generally,
sexual advance) cases is too tenuous to withstand scrutiny.").
121. According to Kahan and Nussbaum, the criminal law has no choice but to judge the
"values embodied in [offenders'] emotional valuations." Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 23, at
359. If that means the criminal law has no choice but tojudge and, if appropriate, condemn an
actor's character, and if that therefore means the criminal law has no choice but to be illiberal,
then for Kahan and Nussbaum, so be it. For, as they put it, "it simply could not be otherwise."
Id. at 360; cf Nicola Lacey, Partial Defenses to Homicide: Questions of Power and Principle in Imperfect
and Less Imperfect Worlds .... in RETHINKING ENGLISH HOMICIDE LAW, supra note 32, at 107, 127
("I would accept the idea that criminal law is inevitably in the business of what might be called
'negative perfectionism': that is, of enforcing some conception of what is beyond the purview of
a good life." (emphasis added)). In response to the objection that an actor should not be
punished for his character because and insofar as he does not, in any meaningful sense of the
word, choose his character, or that the content of an actor's character is more or less a matter of
good or bad luck, Kahan and Nussbaum hold out the possibility of mercy. Although an actor
can be punished for his bad character, he might nonetheless also be eligible for mercy if "some
unusual impediment... deformed the process of character formation." Kahan & Nussbaum,
supra note 23, at 369.
This analysis suffers from at least two problems. First, it is false to claim the criminal
law has no choice but to assess a person's character and, if appropriate, punish him for it. A
liberal state need not and should not punish an actor simply for possessing proscribed beliefs
and desires that he happens to reveal in action. It should punish him only when he accepts
those beliefs and desires and expresses such acceptance in action. Second, a grant of mercy
results in the complete or partial remission of an actor's deserved punishment. But any
punishment imposed on an actor for his character is, at least in a liberal state, undeserved
punishment, whatever tire history of the process leading to his character's fortnation. An actor
who the state proposes to punish for his character is therefore in need ofjustice, not mercy.
122. See, e.g., Hurd & Moore, supra note 102, at 1137 ("Those who persist in thinking it
appropriate for the state to criminalize certain aspects of character must admit, then, that they
are not liberals. Instead, they are probably political perfectionists, who, broadly speaking,
consider it appropriate for the state to use its power to perfect its citizens morally.").
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The point here is not that a liberal state cannot hold its citizens in any
way responsible for the content of their characters. We are responsible for
our characters, if only because we are our characters,12 3 despite the fact that
we cannot control who we are in the same way or to the same degree we can
control what we do. A liberal state is free to establish institutions to educate
its citizens in the ways of a liberal order and inculcate the laudable virtues of
liberal citizenship. 124 Indeed, it can even criticize and censure its illiberal
citizens for their illiberal characters. What it cannot legitimately do is
condemn them for their illiberal characters through the hard treatment of
punishment.125 It cannot heap more punishment on a citizen who, in the
course of violating the criminal law, happens also to reveal the illiberal state
of his soul. A liberal state can punish the Carrs among us for failing to
exercise self-control and killing in the heat of passion, but it cannot punish
them more just because they get angry when a citizen of liberal virtue would
not.
In the end, none of the excuse-based theories of provocation examined
above can solve passion's puzzle. All of them leave pieces of the puzzle
unexplained, and at least one punishes inadequately provoked actors for the
bad character they display in their actions.
C. NEITHER PARTIAL JUSTIFICA TION NOR PARTIAL EXCUSE
Two recent theories of provocation can be construed as promising a
solution to passion's puzzle without recourse to the traditional concepts of
justification or excuse. 12 6 Provocation, so they claim, is neither a traditional
123. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self 105 HARV. L. REV.
959, 974 (1992) ("I am responsible for my character in the sense that my character's
emanations and manifestations are simply generated by me. I am their author... because I am
my character."); Angela M. Smith, Identification and Responsibility, in MORAL RESPONSilLuY AND
ONTOLOGY 233, 245 (Ton van den Beld ed., 2000) (claiming that "our responsibility for our
attitudes---our desires, emotions, and other intentional mental states-"does not flow from our
decisions, but from the fact that they reflect our (implicit or explicit) judgements [sic] about
reasons").
124. Kahan and Nussbaum exaggerate when they imply that refusing to punish an actor for
his bad or illiberal character would "require [I us to treat large numbers of our fellow citizens as
beyond the parameters of rational judgement [sic], and, indeed, to regard the whole business
of shaping one's character and emotions as a matter of happenstance, rather than as part of a
rational public culture." Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 361. A liberal state is free to
shape the content of its citizens' characters in a host of ways, but not through punishment.
125. See, e.g., Robert Merrihew Adams, Involuntary Sins, 94 PHIL. REV. 3, 21 (1985)
("[E]xactly the same responses are [not] appropriate to involuntary as to voluntary sins. In
particular, only voluntary acts and omissions are rightly punished by the state."); George Sher,
Blame for Traits, 35 NOI S 146, 158 (2001) ("[1]t is one thing to say that punishment for traits
[i.e., character] is intelligible, and quite another to say ... that it is defensible.").
126. Although I treat them here as explanatory theories put forth as proposed solutions to
passion's puzzle, these two theories are perhaps better construed as normative endorsements of
more restrictive formulations of the provocation defense, or as normative proposals to reform
more expansive formulations, such as that of the MPC, in favor of more restrictive ones.
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justification nor a traditional excuse, but something else. I pause here to
examine these theories. As it turns out, neither delivers. In my view, both
theories, though billed as something new, are actually partial-justification
theories in disguise.
1 27
1. Evaluative Emotions
Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum have recently proposed a theory of
provocation they claim is neither a partial justification nor a partial128
excuse. The "terms of this debate"-the debate between provocation as
partial justification and provocation as partial excuse-are, they say,
"inadequate.' 2 9 Nonetheless, in the final analysis the Kahan-Nussbaum
theory looks much like a traditional partial-justification theory of the worthy-
motive variety.
Kahan and Nussbaum's theory begins from the premise that our
emotions have a cognitive component.'2 0 We experience certain emotions
127. Both theories discussed below can also plausibly be interpreted as excuse-based
theories in which the adequate-provocation requirement operates as a forfeiture rule. If so,
then both theories are vulnerable to the objection that they end up punishing an actor who
loses self-control in the face of inadequate provocation in part because he has an illiberal or
otherwise disfavored character. See supra pp. 1707-17. Kahan and Nussbaum appear willing to
accept this implication. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 366 (noting that the
"evaluative conception" of emotion on which their theory of provocation rests "demands of
people not only that they conform their conduct to a certain standard, but also that they shape
their characters, and the quality of their emotions, in accordance with prevailing norms of
reasonableness").
128. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 318 (claiming that the "common law
formulation" of the provocation doctrine is "neither" an excuse nor a justification). Kahan and
Nussbaum focus their analysis on the common-law formulation of the provocation doctrine,
believing the MPC formulation should be abandoned insofar as it rests on a "mechanistic"
conception of emotion. See id. at 321 ("In comparison with the common law formulation, the
Model Penal Code version of voluntary manslaughter is decidedly mechanistic."). Nussbaum
has since characterized provocation as a partial excuse, though without elaborating on the
precise nature of its excusing element. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 119, at 133. In this later work,
Nussbaum therefore appears to embrace an excuse-based theory of provocation in which the
adequate-provocation requirement operates as a forfeiture rule.
129. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 318. The terms of this debate are said to be
"inadequate because they embody theories of moral assessment that assume a mechanistic
rather than an evaluative conception of emotion." Id.
130. See id. at 285-89 (describing the "evaluative conception" of emotion). Nussbaum finds
inspiration for her cognitive theory of the emotions in the writings of the Stoics. See id. at 290
("The Greek Stoics... developed the evaluative conception in an especially detailed and
compelling manner, presenting most of the arguments that we... give[] ... about its structure
and its explanatory power."); see asoJohn Deigh, Nussbaum's Defense of the Stoic Theory of Emotions,
19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 293, 296 (2000) ("The theory [of emotion] that Nussbaum advances is a
modified version of the classical theory of Stoicism."). Ronald de Sousa has described this
theory as "[t ] he most parsimonious type of cognitivist theory." Ronald de Sousa, Emotion, in THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHiLOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2003), available at
http://plato.sanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/emotion/.
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because we hold certain beliefs, whether those beliefs are true or false,
appropriate or inappropriate. A person gets angry, for example, if and
because he believes he has been wronged. We can therefore judge the
appropriateness of his anger because we can judge the appropriateness
(according to some system of norms) of the belief on which his anger
rests.1 Was the actor truly wronged or not? If he was, how gravely was he
wronged? Grave wrongs fairly give rise to great anger; small wrongs fairly
give rise to slight anger.
Now, the law does not permit an actor to kill someone who has wronged
him, no matter how gravely he has been wronged. The law generally permits
private actors to use deadly force only in self-defense or in defense of others.
Nonetheless, according to Kahan and Nussbaum, the law of provocation
recognizes that an actor who kills upon adequate provocation is one who
kills for reasons more worthy, or at least less unworthy, than one who kills
upon inadequate provocation or upon no provocation whatsoever. 13 2 The
provocation doctrine is designed to mitigate the liability of those actors who
kill for worthy reasons. So understood, the Kahan-Nussbaum theory is a
species of the worthy-motive theory.1 As such, we should expect it to have
trouble explaining the passion and reasonable loss of self-control
requirements, since the relative worthiness of an actor's motive is the same
whether he kills in hot blood or cold blood, or whether he tries to exercise
self-control or not.
Though Kahan and Nussbaum do not address the reasonable loss of
self-control requirement, they do say their theory can explain the passion
In her most recent writings, Nussbaum acknowledges the many "kinetic" features
associated with the emotions, but nonetheless argues "that all these features are not only not
incompatible with, but are actually best explained by, a version of the ancient Greek Stoic view,
according to which emotions are forms of evaluative judgment that ascribe great importance to
things and persons outside one's control." Martha Nussbaum, Emotions asJudgments of Value and
Importance, in THINKING ABOUT FEELING: CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS ON EMOTIONS 183, 185
(Robert C. Solomon ed., 2004); see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE
INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 57 (2001) (arguing that judgments are sufficient for emotions and
nothing else is necessary, although noting "we should be open-minded and humble" about this
"extremely difficult question").
131. Kahan and Nussbaum appear to endorse the use of prevailing social or community
norms in order to evaluate the "appropriateness" of an actor's emotion. See Kahan & Nussbaum,
supra note 23, at 310 ("[C]ontemporary authorities make the adequacy of provocation an issue
of fact for the jury so that the law may assess emotions against the backdrop of community
mores."). At the same time, however, they urge judges to take cases away from the jury if and
because the social norms a jury's members would presumably apply would be "inappropriate"
because they were derived from a "bad morality." See id. at 362-65. The norms with respect to
which a judge is supposed to evaluate prevailing social norms as good or bad is, so far as I can
tell, left unspecified.
132. See id. at 315 ("[A] n undesirable act can be carried out for a variety of reasons and is
more or less worthy of condemnation depending on what the actor's motives for doing that act
express.").
133. See supra pp. 1693-95 (explaining worthy-motive theory).
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requirement. 4 As they see it, the passion requirement allows the judge or
jury to assess the worthiness or appropriateness of an actor's motives or
reasons for killing.' 35 An actor who kills in the heat of passion is one whose
killing expresses appropriate anger; anger is appropriate if it is based on
adequate provocation; and provocation is adequate if it comports with
prevailing social norms. But this analysis does not explain the passion
requirement. It eliminates it. Adequate provocation gives rise to appropriate
anger, which provides a worthy motive for the killing, which in turn provides
the basis for reducing what would otherwise be murder to manslaughter.
Everything therefore depends on the adequacy of the provocation to which
the actor responds, not on passion.
Kahan and Nussbaum contrast their cognitive theory of emotion, which
they call the "evaluative conception," ' 35 with what they style the "mechanistic
conception," according to which emotions are non-cognitive "energies that
impel the person to action, without embodying ways of thinking about or
perceiving objects or situations in the world."' 3 7 On the mechanistic view,
"emotions are seen as feelings relatively devoid of... cognitive content."'38
According to Kahan and Nussbaum, the doctrines of the substantive
criminal law have long reflected the evaluative conception, as indeed they
should, since its competitor, the mechanistic conception, is a false theory of
the emotions. As such, any effort to understand the criminal law with the
mechanistic conception in mind is bound to produce distortion.
134. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 315 ("Because it focuses on motives and not
just outcomes, the evaluative view is perfectly able to explain why the traditional doctrine
confines mitigation to those who experience 'heat of passion.'"). Kahan and Nussbaum also
claim their theory can explain the common law's "'cooling time' limitation." See id. at 316-18.
They are nonetheless "fully prepared to concede that the evaluative account of 'cooling time' is
neither perfect nor exclusive." Id. at 318.
135. See id. at 315 (claiming that without the heat of passion requirement "it would be
impossible to understand the defendant's act as expressing an appropriate valuation of the
good.., that is threatened by the victim's wrongful provocation").
136. See id. at 285-89 (giving a "[blasic [alccount" of the evaluative conception). For Kahan
and Nussbaum, particular beliefs or judgments are (1) "constituent parts" of a corresponding
emotion (and not simply a cause thereof); (2) "necessary conditions" for the existence of the
emotion; and (3) "most of the time anyway," "sufficient conditions" for the existence of the
emotion. See id. at 293-95 (describing "different species of the evaluative conception"
(emphasis omitted)).
137. Id. at 278. The "mechanistic theory," sometimes called the "feeling theory," is most
prominently associated with the work of William James and Carl G. Lange. See William James,
What is an Emotion?, 19 MIND 188, 189-90 (1884) ("My thesis.., is that bodily changes follow
directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur
is the emotion.").
138. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 279.
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Our emotions are, as Kahan and Nussbaum rightly insist, cognitive.' In
fact, cognitivism has been described as the modern "orthodoxy" with respect
to the ontology of the emotions. 40 But if the mechanistic conception
understates the cognitive, the evaluative conception has the opposite
problem. It overstates the cognitive and, more importantly, understates the
affective and conative. Emotions are about beliefs, but they are also about
feelings and desires.14 1 Indeed, if the cognitive theory emerged as a
philosophical rebellion against the narrowness of the mechanistic
conception, signs of a counter-rebellion can now be detected.142 The goal of
139. For some scholars the "cognitive" nature of the emotions is best understood, not so
much as a kind of evaluative judgment, but rather as a kind of perception, or more precisely, as a
"way[] of seeing-species of determinate patterns of salience among objects of attention, lines
of inquiry, and inferential strategies." de Sousa., supra note 130; see also RONALD DE SOUSA, THE
RATIONALITY OF EMOTION 172 (1987) ("Emotions... control[] the salience of features of
perception and reasoning."); Robert C. Roberts, Wat An Emotion Is: A Sketch, 97 PHIL. REV. 183,
184 (1988) (characterizing emotions as "concern-based construals"); Am6lie 0. Rorty,
Explaining Emotions, in EXPLAINING EMOTIONS 103, 113 (Amhlie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980)
(stating that emotions have "quasi-intentional components [that] form patterns of focusing and
salience").
140. See de Sousa, supra note 130; see alsoJohn Deigh, Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions,
104 ETHICS 824, 824 (1994) ("Cognitivism now dominates the philosophical study of
emotions."). Kahan and Nussbaum claim the evaluative conception "can explain why the
emotions seem to have urgency or heat: because they concern our most important goals and
projects, the most urgent transactions we have in the world." Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 23,
at 289. But this explanation for the heat or urgency associated with emotion over-
intellectualizes the phenomenon.
141. According to one writer, for example, "emotions are constituted by certain cognitions,
desires, and affects, such that these elements are individually necessary and, when dynamically
linked,jointy sufficient for emotion."JUSTIN OAKLEY, MORALITYAND THE EMOTIONS 7 (1992).
142. Robert C. Solomon, Emotion, Thoughts and Feelings: What is a "Cognitive Theory" of the
Emotions and Does It Neglect Affectivity?, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE EMOTIONS 1, 1 (Anthony
Hatimoysis ed., 2003) (describing the cognitive theory of emotion as a "revolution" to which
theories emphasizing "affect programmes" are a "counter-revolution"). Expressions of this
counter-rebellion can be found in, for example, PETER GOLDIE, THE EMOTIONS: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION 4 (2000) ("[M]y position can be seen as retaining what is right
about the traditional view that intentionality [cognition] is essential to emotion, but bringing in
feeling in the right place, as an ineliminable part of the intentionality of emotional
experience,... not merely as an afterthought."); DAVID PUGMIRE, REDISCOVERING EMOTION 4
(2004) ("My claim is that the attempt to understand emotions in terms of one or another type
of thought [cognition], however instructive, finally fails. It either obscures the dimension of
affect or misrepresents it, notwithstanding the ingenious efforts of some writers to avoid this.");
MICHAEL STOCKER, VALUING EMOTIONS 54-55 (1996) (concluding that "emotions involve
affectivity," that such affectivity is "irredicihl[el," and that the "moral importance of emotions"
depends "at least in part" on the "irreducibility of such affectivity"); de Sousa, supra note 130
("[A] consensus may be building, according to which the reaction against 'feeling theories' of
emotion was excessive, because it was too hastily assumed that feelings could not have
intentionality."); Peter Goldie, Emotion, Feeling, and Knowledge of the World, in THINKING ABOUT
FEELING, supra note 130, at 91 (claiming that cognitivism is good "so far as it goes," but that
cognitivism "leaves out.., feelings.., and [makes] no mention of how profoundly and
systematically our emotional feelings can mislead us-of how the emotions can distort
perception and reason"); Geoffrey Madell, Emotion and Feeling 1, 71 ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 147,
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this counter-rebellion is not to overthrow the cognitive theory, but simply to
win recognition of the fact that emotion cannot live on cognition alone.
Cognition is important, but feeling and desire also have an important part to
play in any adequate analysis of the emotions.
43
The dichotomy Kahan and Nussbaum draw between the evaluative
conception and its mechanistic competitor is overdrawn.144 Caught in its
grip, they sensibly choose the evaluative and reject the mechanistic, which is
the only real choice the dichotomy allows. Unfortunately, the evaluative
conception's overemphasis on the cognitive, at the expense of the affective
and conative, forces Kahan and Nussbaum to give us a theory of the heat of
passion with neither heat nor passion. Consequently, when all is said and
done, they are left with a partial-justification theory, one in which adequately
provoked actors are convicted of manslaughter instead of murder because
and only because they kill for a worthy motive. All the passion is gone.
149 (Supp. 1997) ("Feeling... cannot reduce to a structure or network of judgements [sic],
but nor can it be regarded as a pure epiphenomenon, a sort of affective varnish which could be
cleaned off without serious consequences."),
143. This statement is intentionally vague. I see no need to take a position on the best or
correct philosophical account of the emotions. It suffices for present purposes only to insist that
an acceptable analysis of the emotions must make some room for affective and conative
elements capable of distorting an actor's judgment or of causing an actor to act against his
better judgment. An excellent overview of the current state of philosophical play over the
emotions, together with a "summary and guide to the recent literature," can be found in de
Sousa, supra note 130.
144. See R.D. Mackay & B.J. Mitchell, But is this Provocation? Some Thoughts on the Law
Commission's Report on Partial Defences to Murder, 2005 CRIM. L. REv. 44, 49 [hereinafter Mackay &
Mitchell, Some Thoughts] ("Psychologists would almost certainly argue that the reality lies
somewhere in between the two schools of thought suggested by Kahan and Nussbaum."); Gary
Watson, Excusing Addiction, 18 lAw & PHIL. 589, 610 n.60 (1999). As Watson says:
Kahan and Nussbaum's larger argument on behalf of an "evaluative" rather than a
mechanistic" conception of emotions ... seems to me to rest on an overly simple
contrast: emotions are either evaluations, and hence reasonable or unreasonable,
or they are brute, nonrational forces that impede moral agency. In fact, emotions
are both evaluative states and states that potentially interfere with radonal control
in various ways.
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2. Warranted Excuse
Another "new theory" 141 of provocation comes from Victoria Nourse.1
46
Although Nourse ultimately says provocation "remains an excuse,', 147 she
does so simply "because it depends upon the particular defendant's state of
mind (his emotional reactions, rather than his act)," 4s and not because the
actor lacked either the capacity or a fair opportunity to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law, which are usually thought to be the hallmarks of
an excuse. Moreover, although Nourse criticizes the Kahan-Nussbaum
theory, 149 her theory and the Kahan-Nussbaum theory are, truth be told,
really members of the same partial-justification family. Kahan and Nussbaum
give us a worthy-motive theory. Nourse gives us a disproportionate-response
theory. The differences between them boil down to sibling rivalry.
145. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1389.
146. Nourse describes partial-justification theories as "traditional" theories, and partial-
excuse theories as "liberal" theories. She claims her "warranted excuse" theory is "new" because
it "rejects both traditional and liberal views of the defense at the same time that it seeks to unify
them." Id. at 1397. Again, one can interpret Nourse's theory, like that of Kahan and Nussbam,
as a partial-excuse theory in which the adequate-provocation requirement functions as a
forfeiture rule. If so, then the theory again ends up punishing an actor who kills only because
he loses self-control in the face of inadequate provocation for having a bad character. Indeed, I
worry that punishing character is the darker and unspoken side of the "new normativity" or
"new culpability" Nourse detects and celebrates in recent criminal-law scholarship. See V.F.
Nourse, Ilearts and Minds: Understanding the New Culpability, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 361 (2002);
Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of Judgment in the
Criminal Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1435 (1998).
Nourse is especially critical of "liberal" or "reform" theories of provocation,
exemplified most clearly in the MPC's formulation of the defense. Nourse claims "liberal" or
"reform" theories are often used in practice to secure ianslaughter convictions for men who
kill women with whom they were having a relationship, alleging as provocation nothing other
than the fact that the woman was trying to leave the relationship. See Nourse, supra note 23, at
1333 ("In the end, reform has transformed passion from the classical adultery to the modern
dating and moving and leaving. And because of that transformation, these killings, at least in
reform states, may no longer carry the law's name of murder."). Nourse attempts to support this
empirical claim with an analysis of reported cases. See id. at 1342-68. However, a recent analysis
of provocation cases in New York County, a jurisdiction that applies the MPC formulation,
challenges the truth of this claim. See Stuart M. Kirschner et al., The Defense of Extreme Emotional
Disturbance: A Qualitative Analysis of Cases in New York County, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'V & L. 102,
131 (2004) ("[Clontrary to the suggestions of Nourse and Kahan and Nussbaum, it appears
from our data that men who kill women who have left them are not able to plead successfully an
EED defense in New York.").
147. Nourse, supra note 23, at 1398; accord id. at 1382 ("1 believe that the [provocation]
defense is most definitely an excuse, although not in the traditional understanding of that
term."); V.F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1717
(2003) (characterizing provocation in its "'reform' incarnations" as "fall[ing] in the excuse or
partial-excuse camp").
148. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1398.
149. See id. at 1399-1401.
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Like Kahan and Nussbaum, Nourse bases her theory of provocation on
a cognitive theory of the emotions. 0 We get angry when and because we
believe we have been wronged. That belief in turn can be judged true or
false, appropriate or inappropriate (according to some system of norms).
For Nourse, an alleged provocation is adequate, and thus provides an
adequate reason to get angry, if and only if it constitutes a wrong to which
the law itself would respond with violence (in the form of incarceration)."'
So, while Kahan and Nussbaum would rely on social norms to judge the
adequacy of an alleged provocation, Nourse would rely on the law's own
norms, at least as a first approximation. 1 Thus, according to Nourse, the
adequately provoked actor responds to the victim's wrongdoing "with a rage
shared by the law."'5 3 As such, the law must "protect" ' an adequately
provoked actor's emotions; otherwise, the law would "contradict[] itself," 5'
whereas no such contradiction is involved when the law refuses to extend
mitigation in cases involving inadequate provocation.
At the same time, however, the law must "condemn, at least partially,
those who take the law in their own hands";156 otherwise, it would fail to
"maintain its monopoly on violence."' 57 The defense to which the adequately
provoked actor is entitled is therefore only a partial defense. The defense
might also be partial, not only because the adequately provoked actor takes
the law into his own hands, but also because the violence he uses in response
to the victim's wrongdoing is excessive in comparison to the violence the law
150. See id. at 1390-91.
151. See id. at 1396 ("The law only suffers contradiction [by denying a provocation defense
to an actor] when it refuses to embrace a sense of outrage which is necessary to the law's
rationalization of its own use of violence.").
152. Nourse says in a footnote that her "proposal does not adopt the view that unlawfulness
of the provoking behavior is a sufficieni test of warranted outrage." Id. at 1396 n.381 (emphasis
added). Instead:
Lawfulness is [only] a guide to those kinds of outrage the law must protect. It is not
a doctrinal standard. Nor should it be applied without regard to the ultimate
purpose of the inquiry-to determine whether the defendant is asking us to accept
a claim that permits him to legislate emotional blame vs-.-vis his victim.
Id. (emphasis added). Nourse goes on: "My argument that coherence compels the criminal law
to protect the emotions to which the State itself appeals to justify its use of violence depends
upon the potential use of violence, not unlawfulness in name only, nor in the violation of widely
held social norms." Id. at 1396-97 n.383. Yet once all these caveats and qualifications are
entered, the exact contours of Nourse's proposed test for the adequacy of an alleged
provocation become difficult to discern. Cf Horder, supra note 42, at 137 n.63.
153. Nourse, supra note 23, at 1393.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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itself would use. On this reading, Nourse's theory bears a striking
resemblance to the disproportionate-response theory.'"
Consequently, the challenge for Nourse's theory, as for any partial-
justification theory, is to come up with plausible explanations for the passion
and reasonable loss of self-control requirements. Nourse explains neither.
With respect to the passion requirement, Nourse claims her theory can
"explain why we need both emotion and judgment to explain [the
provocation] defense., 159 This statement might fairly be understood as a
promise to explain both the passion requirement ("emotion") and the
adequate-provocation requirement ("judgment"). If so, then that promise
cannot be kept, for the cognitive conception of emotion on which Nourse's
theory relies reduces emotion to judgment. Emotion's passion disappears, as
it does in the Kahan-Nussbaum theory.160 All that's left isjudgment.
158. See supra pp. 1695-98 (explaining the disproportionate-response theory). Nourse
nonetheless insists her theory is not a partial-justification theory. She does so for a variety of
reasons, all of which are open to dispute. First, she says a partial-justification theory cannot take
account of the "defendant's perception of the triggering act," whereas her theory does. Nourse,
supra note 23, at 1395. But Finbarr McAuley, an acknowledged proponent of the partial-
justification theory, appears to say just the opposite. See McAuley, Anticipating, supra note 20, at
141 ("There is therefore nothing in the theory of justification which precludes a defendant
from relying on a reasonably mistaken belief that this victim provoked him."). Second, she says
the "defendant's characteristics" are "irrelevant to the partial justification model," but not to
hers. Nourse, supra note 23, at 1395. But again, McAuley appears to say just the opposite. See
McAuley, Anticipating, supra note 20, at 146-47 ("Nothing in the foregoing analysis should be
taken to mean that the accused's personal characteristics are entirely irrelevant to the issue of
provocation.., other than those affecting the accused's temperament... .'). Third, she seems
to say that partial-justification theories embrace the so-called "cooling-off" requirement, at least
insofar as they exclude cases "in which emotion builds over time," whereas her theory rejects
any such requirement and thus encompasses such cases. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1395 &
n.377. But, as McAuley says, partialjustification theories reject the cooling-off requirement. See
McAuley, Anticipating, supra note 20, at 156 (noting that the cooling-off requirement is a
requirement of the common-law doctrine, but "submitt(ingl that [under a partial-justification
theory] a defendant who can show that he killed in the face of substantial provocation should,
on this ground alone, be entitled to the defence').
Moreover, according to Nourse, partialojustification theorists are forced into saying
"that there is something partially 'right' about killing or that some people 'deserve' to die."
Nourse, supra note 23, at 1398. This is an overstatement. The most plausible partial-justification
theories claim only that the victim deserved some form of retaliation in response to his
wrongdoing, not that the victim deserved to die for it. Nourse also says that her "proposal does
not depend upon the theory that the victim deserves to be punished." Id. at 1395. That's true if
it means the victim does not deserve to be punished 6y the person he provoked. It's not true if it
means the victim does not deserve to be punished by the state. On Nourse's theory, a victim guilty
of adequate provocation does deserve to be punished by the state, at least insofar as an alleged
provocation is, according to Nourse, adequate if and only if it constitutes a wrong to which the
law would respond with punishment (i.e., if and only if it constitutes a crime).
159. Nourse, supra note 23, at 1397.
160. Nourse also claims her theory "requires spontaneous emotion." Id. at 1398. But why
that should be so is a mystery. Such spontaneity might be needed in order to support a
defendant's claim to have killed because he lacked, as Nourse puts it, "a full or fair capacity for
self-control." Id. But that answer is unavailable to Nourse, since she explicitly rejects the
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With respect to the reasonable loss of self-control requirement, Nourse
explicitly rejects the idea that "we partially excuse because the defendant
lacks a full or fair capacity for self-control."' 6' Instead, she claims, "decisions
applying [the provocation doctrine] express judgments about when
defendants 'should' exercise self-control." 62
One assumes an actor "should," on Nourse's account, exercise self-
control whenever he faces inadequate provocation. If he does not, his failure
to do so is necessarily unreasonable, and courts should deny him the
defense. Conversely, so it would seem, an actor is free not to exercise self-
control whenever the provocation he confronts is adequate. Of course, the
law might hope an actor faced with adequate provocation will nonetheless try
to control his desire to kill, but he labors under no obligation to do so. If so,
then any judgment as to when an actor should exercise self-control depends
entirely on the nature of the provocation he faces. Actors should always
exercise self-control in the face of inadequate provocation, but they need
not exercise self-control in the face of adequate provocation. Consequently,
all that really matters in the end is the adequacy or inadequacy of the
provocation. The reasonable loss of self-control requirement, like the
passion requirement, disappears.
In the final analysis, the Kahan-Nussbaum and Nourse theories of
provocation are partial-justification theories traveling incognito. As such,
they cannot explain the passion or reasonable loss of self-control
requirements. The puzzle remains unsolved.
III. A SOLUTION TO THE PUZZLE
Partial-justification theories can explain the adequate-provocation and
partiality requirements, but they tend to founder on the passion and
reasonable loss of self-control requirements. Partial-excuse theories have the
opposite problem. They can explain the passion and reasonable loss of self-
control requirements, but struggle with the adequate-provocation and
partiality requirements.
The challenge is to construct a the6ry capable of combining all the
elements of provocation into a normatively attractive whole. The theory set
forth below, which purports to meet this challenge, sees provocation as
neither an excuse nor a justification, as those concepts are commonly
understood. It sees provocation instead as a doctrine designed to mitigate
the punishment of those actors who kill, not in defiance of the law, but out
of ignorance or weakness. The killer with a valid provocation defense is, so
"idea ... that we partially excuse because the defendant lacks a full or fair capacity for self-
control." Id.
161. Id. It bears noting that, while the idea of a "fair" or "unfair" opportunity makes sense,
the idea of a "fair" or "unfair" capacity does not. A capacity is what it is. It cannot be "fair" or
"unfair."
162. Nourse, supra note 23, at 1398 (emphasis added).
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to speak, an akratic killer. Hence the name of the theory: provocation as
akrasia.
A. PROVOCATION AS AKRAS1A
Provocation as akrasia is based on a distinction between two forms of
criminal culpability, which represent two different ways in which an actor
can breach the obligations the criminal law imposes on him.
1. Two Forms of Criminal Culpability
The criminal law creates and imposes obligations. Breaching these
obligations warrants condemnation through retributive punishment.'63 In a
liberal democracy, the criminal law's obligations should have a democratic
pedigree. They should represent obligations we impose on ourselves for the
common good. They should also be liberal in both form and content. They
should speak to us clearly and should generally concern themselves with
intentional or reckless acts or omissions that cause or risk causing harm to
others."" A liberal state does not punish an actor merely because his action
gives offense, nor does it punish him merely because he gives offense, having
an illiberal or otherwise disreputable character.
An actor can breach an obligation the criminal law imposes on him in
two very different ways. First, he can defy it.16 An actor defies the law when
he knows the law tells him not to W, but he wholeheartedly chooses to W,
despite the law's demand to the contrary. In other words, an actor defies the
163. I make no effort here to defend retribution, according to which the state is either
entitled or obligated to impose punishment on a criminal wrongdoer because and to the extent
such an offender deserves to be punished. My general thoughts on this broader issue can be
found in Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801 (1999).
164. The classic statement and defense of the harm principle is JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY 13 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956) (1859). See also I JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 11 (1984) (offering an "effort to vindicate the traditional
liberalism derived from Mill's On Liberty"). But see MEIR DAN-COHEN, Defending Digniy, in
HARMFUL THOUGHTS: ESSAYS ON LAW, SELF, AND MORALITY 150, 150 (2002) (arguing that the
harm principle should be replaced "by what may be called the dignity principle"); Bernard E.
Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 115 (1999)
(arguing that the "harm principle no longer acts today as a limiting principle with regard to the
legal enforcement of morality").
165. Jean Hampton has argued that the criminal law's concept of mens rea (guilty mind) is
best understood as defiance. SeeJean Hampton, Mens Rea, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POLY 1, 1, 24 (1990)
("[D]efiance... constitutes legal mens rea."). Hampton's conception of mens rea in the
criminal law derives from a more general analysis of the nature of immorality. See Jean
Hampton, The Nature ofimmorality, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 22 (1989); see also MILO, supra note 24,
at 185-218 (discussing a form of immorality analogous to Hampton's conception of defiance
called "preferential wickedness"). Although I agree with Hampton that defiance is one
important form of criminal culpability, I disagree with her insofar as she believes (as she
appears to) that defiance is the only form of criminal culpability. See Garvey, supra note 24, at
280-83 (criticizing Hampton on this ground); see alsoJeremy Horder, Criminal Culpability: The
Possibility of a General Theory, 12 LAW & PHIL. 193, 195-98 (1993) (same).
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law if, when he acts against its demands, he does so with full knowledge of the
law and full consent of the will."' An actor who defies the law is, one might say,
"full of will," or more simply, willfuL He displays an excessive pride or hubris
in himself and contempt for the law. Because he willfully chooses to pursue
his own ends in defiance of the law's obligations, the defiant actor
symbolically elevates himself above the law. Consequently, when a defiant
actor is punished, the immediate point of doing so is to humble him, or
more precisely, to humble his defiant will, 167 and thereby issue a public
statement denying his false claim to superiority.' 65
Second, he can violate the law without defying it. An actor violates the
law without defiance when either of the conditions necessary for defiance is
missing. For example, an actor who honestly believes the law permits him to
(p has not defied the law against q-ing. He has acted in ignorance of the law,
not in defiance. Nonetheless, such an act is culpable if the ignorance in
which it is done is itself culpable insofar as the actor could and should have
realized the law prohibited his action. An offense committed in honest but
unreasonable ignorance of the law is therefore a culpable act, 16 but not a
defiant one.
166. See Garvey, supra note 24, at 282.
167. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, A New Theory of Retribution, in LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
377, 400 n.26 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1991) ("I see punishment as the delivery
of a defeat to the wrongdoer, as an experience of submission, of being dominated."); Herbert
Fingarette, Punishment and Suffering, 50 PRoc. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. Ass'N 499, 510 (1977)
("Punishing is the humbling of the defiant-or at least the disrespectful-will.").
168. See, eg., Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS
CRITICS 1, 12 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992) ("Retributive punishment is a way of denying a false
message about worth, and thus a way of vindicating the worth of those who have been victims of
wrongdoing.").
169. If an actor's ignorance of the law or mistake of law was not only honest but also
reasonable, he should, in my view, be entitled to a full excuse, as successive generations of
scholars have long argued. See, e.g., Douglas Husak & Andrew von Hirsch, Culpability and Mistake
of Law, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 157, 173 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) ("[A]
defendant who is ignorant of the applicable legal rule... should ordinarily... be excused if his
legal mistake was a reasonable one ... ; or... have his punishment mitigated if he did riot
know but should have known of the conduct's illegality,"); Gunther Arzt, The Problem of Mistake
of Law, 1986 BYU L. REV. 711, 713 ("[Mlens rea.., implies knowledge of a violation of the
law."): Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & MARY L. Rrv. 671,
695 (1976) (concluding that "the doctrine [of ignorantia legis] is both inefficacious and
unjust"); Laurence D. Houlgate, Ignoratia Juris: A Plea for Justice, 78 ETHICS 32, 36 (1967)
("Ignuorance of the law (when 'reasonable') . .. defeats any case for saying that a person who
offends because of said ignorance obtains an unfair advantage. Hence, justice dictates his
exemption."); Paul K. Ryu & Helen Silving, ErrorJuris: A Comparative Study, 24 U. CHI. L. REV.
421, 468 (1957) ("To be subject to [legitimate punishment] the actor.., must know the rule
which he violates."); cf Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is An Excuse-But Only For the
Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 131 (1997) (arguing, contrary to the orthodox view, that
"ignorance of the law is [in fact] an excuse-but only for the virtuous").
Moreover, although reasonable ignorance of the law is no excuse under prevailing
doctrine, federal courts nonetheless tend to construe, where possible, the mens rea
requirements of federal criminal statutes so as to diminish the risk of convicting those who act
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Likewise, an actor does not defy the law if, though knowing the law
prohibits p-ing, he chooses to y but without full consent of the will. On the
one hand, such an actor wants to pursue his own ends, ends at odds with his
legal obligations. On the other hand, he knows what the law expects of him,
believes he should conform to its demands, and indeed, wants so to
conform. But he fails to resist the desire to pursue his own ends.
Consequently, he winds up acting against his better judgment and in
violation of the law, but he does so without wholeheartedly embracing the
law-breaking desire that his will translates into action. He could and should
have obeyed the law, but he failed to do so. Like an offense committed in
honest but unreasonable ignorance of the law's demands, an offense
committed due to such weakness of will is a culpable act, but again, not a
defiant one.
1 70
The key to solving provocation's puzzle lies in recognizing how the
doctrine's pieces work together to distinguish actors who kill in defiance of
the law from those who do not. In other words, provocation separates those
who kill in defiance from those who kill either in a moment of ignorance, in
which the actor honestly believes the law allowed him to kill, or in a moment
of weakness, in which the actor's will executes a desire to kill despite his
belief that he should comply with the law and despite his countervailing
(though insufficient) desire so to comply. Actors guilty of murder kill in
or fail to act in reasonable ignorance of their legal obligations. See, e.g., Sharon L. Davies, The
Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE LJ. 341, 344 (1998)
("'Knowledge of illegality' has now been construed to be an element in a wide variety of
[federal] statutory and regulatory criminal provisions... ."); John Shepard WAileyJr., Not Guilty
By Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1023
(1999) (stating that "[w]hen reading statutes, the Justices today suppose that Congress does not
want blameless people to be convicted of serious federal crimes[,]" thereby "amend[ing] the
medieval slogan that ignorance of the law is no excuse").
170. One might object that the entire phenomenon of weakness of will is, despite its
familiarity, illusory. Such skepticism about the possibility of weakness of the will generally takes
two forms. First, some philosophers believe putative cases of weakness of the will are really cases
of ignorance, since in their view an actor never knowingly acts contrary to his better judgment.
Plato famously held this position. See PLATO, The Protagoras, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF
PLATO *358(c) (W.K.C. Guthrie trans., Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
Second, some philosophers believe putative cases of weakness of the will are really cases of
coercion (i.e., cases in which an actor could not have done otherwise). See, e.g., Gary Watson,
Skepticism About Weakness of Will, 86 PHIL. REv. 316, 330-33 (1977). For present purposes I
assume these challenges, each of which tries to reduce the phenomenon of weakness of the will
to something else, can successfully be fended off. For helpful book-length treaunents of the
general subject, see, for example, WILLIM CHARLTON, WrEAKNESS OF WILL (1988); ROBERT
DUNN, THE POSSIBILITY OF WEAKNESS OF WILL (1987); JUSTIN GOSLING, WEAKNESS OF THE WILL
(1990). For a recent collection of essays, which also contains a comprehensive bibliography, see
WEAKNESS OF WILL AND PRACTICAL IRRATIONALITY (Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet eds.,
2003).
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defiance of the law.' 71 Actors guilty of manslaughter kill in ignorance or
weakness.
In the end, the culpability of an actor guilty of manslaughter consists in
his failure to exercise his capacity for self-control. 72 Gripped with a desire to
kill his provocateur, he could and should have controlled that desire. But he
failed to do so. His will therefore executes his desire to kill, translating it
into action. Such failures of self-control can be either director indirect.
173
First, an actor's failure to control his desire to kill can affect his action
directly. The provoked actor experiences a provocation-induced desire to
kill, which his will ultimately translates into action, despite his simultaneous
belief that he should instead conform to the law, and despite his having
some desire so to conform. Such direct failures of self-control therefore
involve cases in which the actor kills in a moment of weakness, or what
might be called cases of practical akrasia. The actor fails to control the
influence of desire on his action.
Second, an actor's failure to control his desire to kill can affect his
action indirectly. The direct effect of the actor's desire to kill is not on his
action, but on his beliefs. Here the provoked actor's desire to kill distorts his
171. An actor is guilty of murder under the MPC if he purposely or knowingly causes death
without a valid excuse or justification. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(a) (1985). He is also
guilty of murder if he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death and
causes death "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life." Id. § 210.2(1) (b). This latter form of homicide-known as "extreme indifference" murder
under the MPG or "depraved heart" murder at common law-is fairly graded at the same level
as purposeful or knowing (and unjustified) homicides insofar as an actor who consciously
disregards a substantial risk of death for an especially reprehensible reason or motive is
arguably just as culpable as one who, for example, consciously disregards a practically certain
risk of death for a less reprehensible, or perhaps even benign, reason or motive falling short of
the requirements of a statutorily-recognized justification. Cf Larry Alexander, Insufficient
Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931,940 (2000) ("[A]I1 cases
of knowledge [are not] more culpable than all cases of recklessness, even where the harm
risked is the same.").
Most actors guilty of murder defy the law because they typically act with full knowledge
of the law and full consent of the will. One exception would involve non-provoked actors who,
though guilty of murder under existing doctrine, do not defy the law because they honestly but
erroneously believe their action is legally permissible. Such actors act not in defiance of the law
but in ignorance of it, whether their ignorance is reasonable or unreasonable.
172. For present purposes, I assume the commonplace distinction between, on the one
hand, an actor who can exercise self-control and who tries but fails to do so on the present
occasion, and on the other, an actor who has no capacity for self-control, can be adequately
defended. For one such defense, see Michael Smith, Responsibility and Self-Control, in RELATINC
TO RESPONSIBILITY 1, 15-16 (Peter Cane &John Gardner eds., 2001).
173. Whether direct or indirect, the form of akrasia in question involves what has been
called "strict" or "last-ditch" akrasia in which the actor is called upon to exercise self-control at
the moment of acting (known as "synchronic" self-control). See, e.g., MELE, supra note 25, at 7
("Debates about the possibility and explanation of incontinent action typically focus on what I
shall call strict incontinent action, that is, incontinent action against a consciously held better
judgment about something to be done here and no.").
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thinking, causing him momentarily to believe the law actually permits him to
kill. Or perhaps more plausibly, his desire to kill causes him to fail to retain
or access his belief that the law forbids him from killing. The actor's will
then executes his desire to kill. No conflict exists between the actor's desire
to kill and his beliefs about what the law demands of him. Instead, the
actor's desire to kill temporarily blinds him to the law's demands. Such
indirect failures of control therefore involve cases in which the actor kills in
a moment of ignorance of the law, or what might be called cases of epistemic
akrasia.'74 The actor fails to control the influence of desire on his belief
2. Putting the Pieces Together
The akrasia theory solves provocation's puzzle only if it provides a
coherent and normatively attractive explanation for each of the doctrine's
four requirements. Here is how the theory puts the pieces together.
a. Reasonable Loss of Self-Control
The theory can easily explain why the doctrine requires loss of self-
control. According to the akrasia theory, the provoked actor's failure to
control his anger and desire to kill in the face of provocation constitutes his
culpability. It identifies how he has failed to conform his conduct to the law's
demands, and explains why his failure is culpable. A provoked actor's failure
to exercise self-control leads him either to believe the law permitted him to
kill when he could and should have realized, through the exercise of self-
control, it did not, or else to execute his desire to kill when, through the
exercise of self-control, he could and should have controlled it. At the same
time, the loss of self-control requirement distinguishes the provoked killer
from the defiant one, who kills not because he fails to exercise self-control,
but because he willfully defies the law.
A provoked actor claiming the defense must not only lose self-control.
His loss of self-control must also be reasonable. Unfortunately, no coherent
theory of provocation can take the reasonable loss of self-control
174. One can draw a distinction between epistemic or doxastic akrasia, strictly-speaking,
and self-deception. Roughly, and not uncontroversially, epistemic akrasia involves an actor's
believing p due to his desire to believe p, while at the same time consciously believing he should
not believe p (whether based on epistenic considerations alone or on both epistemic and non-
epistemic considerations), whereas self-deception involves an actor's believing or sincerely
avowing p due to his desire to believe p, while at the same time unconsciously believing not-p.
See, e.g., MELE, supra note 25, at 112 (offering an analysis of episteinic akrasia); ALFRED R. MELE,
SELF-DECEPTION UNMASKED 50-51 (2001) (offering sufficient conditions for entering into self-
deception); Robert Audi, Self-Deception, Action, and Will, 18 ERKENNTNIS 133, 137 (1982)
(offering necessary and sufficient conditions for describing an agent as being in a state of self-
deception); Christopher Hookway, Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Virtue, in VIRTUE
EPISTEMOLOGY: ESSAYS ON EPISTEMIC VIRTUE AND RESPONSIBILITY 178, 185 (Abrol Fairweather &
Linda Zagzebski eds., 2001) (describing "components" of a "genuine case of full-blooded
[epistemic] akrasia"). The important point here is that both phenomena involve an actor's
desires or emotions influencing what he believes.
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requirement at face value. The problem is simple: if an actor's loss of self-
control is reasonable, then the actor should be fully excused; conversely, if
losing self-control to the point of killing is never a reasonable response to
provocation, no matter how grave, then no one would be entitled to the
defense. 175
Consequently, the reasonable loss of self-control requirement cannot
mean what it says.' 76 Instead, a provoked actor's loss of self-control can be
described as "reasonable" only in the limited sense that losing self-control is
an all-too-ordinary human failing. Virtuous actors never experience
temptation and so never need to exercise self-control. Continent actors
experience temptation and thus need to exercise self-control, but being
ever-continent, they never lose the battle. Alas, ordinary folks are never
always virtuous, nor even always continent. They sometimes have to battle
with temptation, and sometimes they lose, which is why provocation is
commonly and fairly characterized as a "concession to human frailty"' 77 or
"human weakness."'
78
b. Partiality
The theory can also explain the partiality requirement. A provoked
actor, unlike an insane actor or an actor who commits a crime under duress,
is not entitled to a full defense. An insane actor could not have acted
otherwise, and an actor who commits a crime under duress is permitted to
do so, not according to the law's norms, but according to some other system
of norms to which the law defers.' 79 In contrast, a provoked actor could have
acted otherwise, and no system of norms to which the law is willing to defer
would allow him to kill, not even in the face of adequate provocation. The
provoked actor is therefore culpable. But his culpability is of a different
order compared to that of the defiant actor. The partiality requirement
recognizes this difference.
c. Passion and Adequate Provocation
What about the passion and adequate-provocation requirements? Can
the theory explain them as well? According to the akrasia theory, an actor's
claim to the defense is ultimately based on the fact that he killed, not out of
defiance, but because he failed to exercise self-control, with his failure
leading him to kill in honest ignorance of the law, or due to weakness of will.
175. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 35.
176. But see Macklein & Gardner, supra note 22, at 825 n.21 (insisting that "[w]hen the
standard of self-control in provocation is said to be the standard of the merely 'ordinary'
person, this must be interpreted to mean the ordinarily reuasonable person" but offering no
explanation for why a valid plea of provocation should not then be a full excuse).
177. Uniacke, supra note 19, at 13.
178. Dressler, Heat of Passion, supra note 21, at 442.
179. See sources cited supra note 90.
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As such, the passion and adequate-provocation requirements might appear
superfluous. All that really matters, so it might appear, is the fact that the
actor killed only because he failed to exercise self-control.
But the passion and adequate-provocation requirements do have a role.
The akrasia theory portrays provocation as a doctrine designed to identify
actors who kill only because they fail to exercise self-control. The passion
and adequate-provocation requirements enter this picture, not as
substantive rules, but rather as evidentiary rules. 180 An actor who claims to have
tried but failed to exercise self-control is, all else being equal, simply more
believable if he kills upon adequate provocation in the heat of passion. The
passion and adequate-provocation requirements therefore corroborate the
provoked actor's underlying claim of loss of self-control upon which the
defense of provocation is ultimately based.'8 '
180. See. e.g., 2 SIR GERALD H. GORDON, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 25.34, at 354
(Michael G. A. Christie ed., 2001) ("Instead of being used as a way of testing the truth of the
accused's statement that be lost self-control, the reasonable man has been turned into an
objective standard of self-control."); HART, sapra note 28, at 33 ("Further difficulties of proof
may cause a legal system to limit its inquiry into the agent's 'subjective condition' by asking...
'whether a reasonable man' in the circumstances would have been deprived (say, by
provocation) of self-control...."); J.W. CECIL TURNER, KENNY'S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW
§ 121, at 176 (19th ed. 1966) (arguing that the common-law categories of adequate provocation
"began as a matter of evidence[, but later] crystallized into a rule of law and became an
objective legal test of liability"); 1 J.W. CECIL TURNER, RUSSELL ON CRIME 534 (12th ed. 1964)
(stating that the use of the reasonable man in the law of provocation is "one more illustration of
the way in which a point of evidence has been allowed to slide into a point of law, and of the
inevitable mischief which thereby results"); Dennis Klimchuk, Outrage, Self-Control and
Culpability, 44 U. TORONTO LJ. 441, 454-55 (1994) (explaining how the adequate-provocation
requirement can be "employed ... to determine whether the accused's claim to have lost self-
control was authentic"); Weber, supra note 21, at 159 ("Possibly the requirement of [adequate]
provocation can be justified on the basis that it is necessary to insure that the heat of passion is
genuine.... ."); Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicde I, 37
COLUM. L. REv. 701, 717-18 (1937) ('The English courts.., regarded only a few acts... as
provocative, apparently on the ground that they alone resulted in emotional pressure under
which ordinarily law abiding men might be expected to collapse.").
Kahan and Nussbaum find this portrayal of the adequate-provocation requirement
"implausible," because the common-law categories, "if they were merely generalizations about
the kinds of offenses that typically destroy volition,... seem manifestly underinclusive." Kahan
& Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 308. As Kahan and Nussbaum observe, "[i]t seems implausible,
for example, to think that nineteenth-century decisionmakers would have viewed rage as a
surprising or abnormal reaction to the infidelity of a man's fiance." Id. But insofar as the
dcecisionmakers to which Kahan and Nussbaum refer viewed provocation as a partial
justification, they would naturally not have seen the common-law categories of adequate
provocation as "merely generalizations about the kinds of offenses that typically destroy
volition." Id. On the contrary, those categories would have represented legally recognized
reasons for one citizen intentionally to kill another falling short of self-defense or defense of
others.
181. This interpretation of the adequate-provocation requirement has a respectable
pedigree. According to Horder's historical analysis of English common law, the common-law
categories of adequate provocation, though originally "important as illustrations of the element
of partial justification, of cases where the defendant has not gone too far beyond the mean,"
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Under the akrasia theory, an alleged provocation is adequate if
applicable social norms would permit an actor to use non-lethal violence in
response to it, or at the least would permit some form of overt response,
which in the heat of passion could understandably spill over into lethal
violence.182 The law does not permit the use of any such violence, lethal or
non-lethal. Nor can the applicable social norms be understood to permit the
use of lethal violence. If they did, then provocation would be a full defense
akin to duress. The problem arises when the adequately provoked actor's
desire to respond to the provocation in a socially sanctioned manner
combines with the heat of passion. Under these circumstances the result may
well be a new and intense desire: a desire to use lethal violence, which
neither the law nor prevailing social norms condone. The provoked actor
can and should control this desire, but he fails to do so. He therefore ends
up executing his provocation-induced desire to kill.' 83
were interpreted by the common law courts from roughly the mid-eighteenth to the close of the
nineteenth century as "important, instead, for no more than evidentiary reasons." HORDER,
supra note 16, at 89.
182. Relying on social norms naturally raises a number of difficult questions. How should
those norms be identified? In a multi-cultural society, whose norms count when the norms of
different groups conflict? W"hat if those norms are changing? What if those norms are morally
retrograde? Questions such as these tend especially to come to the fore in so-called cultural-
defense cases. See, e.g., ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE 31-36 (2004)
(discussing the use of cultural evidence in provocation cases). The akrasia theory can provide
no easy answers to these questions, but it does help identify the basic question one should be
asking in such cases: Did the actor kill out of honest ignorance of the law or weakness of will, or
did he kill out of defiance?
183. For efforts to explain how emotions can produce akratic action, see, for example, DE
SOUSA, supra note 139, at 200 (stating that insofar as the "essential role [of the emotions] lies in
establishing specific patterns of salience[,] ... they are perfectly tailored for the role of
arbitrators among" competing beliefs and desires and thereby explaining weakness of the will);
ELSTER, supra note 34, at 330 (noting that "[e]motions may affect behavior in the present by
virtue of the associated arousal (viscerality) that makes one act against one's own better
judgment," or they "may affect beliefs and, through them, behavior"); GOLDIE, supra note 142,
at 111 (stating that emotions can form "the basis for explaining certain sorts of weakness of the
will or akrasia'); Christine Tappolet, Emotions and the Intelligibility of Akratic Action, in WEAKNESS
OF WILL AND PRACTICAL IRRATIONALITY, supra note 170, at 97, 98 ("[S]ince emotions can be
seen as perceptions of values... they have the capacity to make akratic action intelligible, as
distinct from merely causally explainable."). Inasmuch as emotions increase the salience of one
course of action over another, Amelie Rorty's observation that the "akratic alternative
sometimes acquires its attractions by its power to dominate the agent's attention" is also
pertinent. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, Akrasia and Conflict, 23 INQUIRY 193, 209 (1980),
For helpful discussions of how desire and emotion can influence and distort belief,
see, for example, ALFRED R. MELE, AUTONOMOUS AGENTS: FROM SELF-CONTROL TO AUTONOMY
86-101 (1995) [hereinafter, MELE, AUTONOMOUS AGENTS]; MELE, supra note 25, at 109-20;
MELE, SELF-DECEPTION UNMASKED, supra note 174, at 24-49; Tim Dalgleish, Once More with
Feeling: The Role of Emotion in Self-Deception, 20 BEHAV. & BRAIN SC. 110, 110 (1997); Ariela Lazar,
Deceiving Oneself Or Self-Deceived? On the Formation of Beliefs "Under the Influence", 108 MIND 265,
280-84 (1999); Alfred R. Mele, Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception, in PHILOSOPHY,' AND THE
EMOTIONS 163, 169-79 (Anthony Hatzimoysis ed., 2003).
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An actor who pleads provocation is asking the finder of fact to believe
him when he claims to have tried but failed to exercise control over his
desire to kill, such that when he killed he did so in a moment of ignorance
or weakness. Either way, his claim is more believable if the provocation
facing him was adequate and if he killed in the heat of passion. Conversely,
an actor who claims to have tried but failed to control his desire to kill is less
believable if he kills in the face of inadequate provocation or without being
in the heat of passion.1
4
Treating the adequate provocation requirement as an evidentiary rule
means not treating it as a forfeiture rule.1 5 Consequently, the akrasia theory
is not forced to confess, when it denies the defense to the inadequately
provoked actor, that it does so because he has a malformed character. The
akrasia theory denies the defense to the inadequately provoked actor, not
because his character is reprehensible, but because his claim to have lost self-
control is incredible. An actor who kills in the face of inadequate provocation
is therefore punished for murder, not because his character is malformed,
but because the law assumes he killed in defiance of its demands, any claim
he might make to the contrary notwithstanding.
Assigning the adequate-provocation requirement an evidentiary
function, and not a forfeiture function, saves the provocation doctrine from
punishing the inadequately provoked actor for having a bad character. But it
has its own costs. As an evidentiary rule, the adequate-provocation
requirement will deny the defense to an actor who, though he kills only
because he loses self-control, does so in the face of inadequate provocation.
In principle, however, such an actor should be entitled to the defense.
Consequently, the adequate-provocation requirement renders the
provocation doctrine under-inclusive. Thanks to the adequate-provocation
requirement cum evidentiary requirement, the defense will sometimes be
withheld when it should be extended.
The adequate-provocation requirement's wisdom depends on the
balance between its costs and benefits.'86 On the cost side, application of the
rule will inevitably produce some false positives. It will convict for murder
184. A provoked actor is also less believable if he experiences no remorse when his passion
subsides. When a provoked actor regains his senses, he ssould look aghast upon what he has
done. He should feel ashamed for having let his desire to kill distort his understanding of the
law's demands, or for not having gathered the fortitude he could and should have gathered to
comply with those demands. See, e.g., G.R. Sullivan, Anger and Excuse: Reassessing Provocation,
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 425 (1993) ("[T]he essence of the defence is revealed in rash
conduct, conduct which the ethically well-disposed agent will subsequently regret but for which
sympathy, even on occasion empathy, may be attracted.").
185. See supra pp. 1709-17.
186. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 152 (1991) ("[T]he design of any decision-
making procedure involves an assessment of the comparative frequency and consequences of
the different errors.").
1735
HeinOnline -- 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1735 2004-2005
90 IOWA LAWREVIEW
those actors who, though they kill in the face of inadequate provocation, do
so only because they lose self-control, and who should therefore only be
convicted of manslaughter. On the benefit side, application of the rule will
preclude some false negatives. Without an adequate-provocation
requirement, an actor who kills in the face of inadequate provocation
without losing self-control may nonetheless be able to persuade a jury
otherwise, thus securing an unwarranted conviction for manslaughter. If the
false negatives precluded offset the false positives produced, then the
adequate-provocation requirement has something to be said for it.
Otherwise, considerably less can be said.1
7
One final issue remains. According to the akrasia theory, an actor who
kills only because he fails to exercise self-control should be treated
differently from one who kills in defiance. The provocation defense
translates this general principle into legal doctrine. But now consider how
the doctrine should apply when the actor pleading provocation is fairly
described as "hot-headed," "bad-tempered," "exceptionally pugnacious," or
"irascible." Such an actor characteristically or routinely fails to exercise self-
control. As such, even the most defendant-friendly approaches to
187. Eliminating the adequate-provocation requirement would be a step in the direction of
transforming the provocation doctrine into a generic partial defense. See SIMESTER & SULLIVAN,
supra note 17, at 360 ("There is much to be said for the abolition of the defence of provocation
and its replacement by more general and straightforward grounds of extenuation."). Stephen
Morse has recently proposed one version of such a generic partial defense, which he categorizes
as a partial excuse, based on an actor's diminished capacity for "rationality" or "normative
competence," both of which are, according to Morse, "continuum concepts." See Morse, supra
note 36, at 340, 397; see alsoJeremy Horder, Pleading Involuntary Lack of Capacity, 52 CAMBRIDGE
LJ. 298, 316 (1993) (urging the creation of a '"diminished responsibility' verdict that would be
available as a general defence"); R.D. Mackay & BJ. Mitchell, Provoking Diminished Responsibility:
Two Pleas Merging into One?, 2003 CRIM. L. REV. 745, 757-58 (proposing an MPC-like
manslaughter provision designed to merge provocation and diminished capacity into a single
plea according to which an actor's "extreme emotional disturbance" and/or "unsoundness of
mind" are such that "the offence ought to be reduced to one of manslaughter"); cf Alexander,
supra note 90, at 1494 (proposing a generic excuse, as contrasted with a generic partial excuse,
described as a "unified excuse of preemptive self-protection" modeled on the MPC's duress
provision). Morse also offers various reasons why "[c]onsidering partial responsibility only at
sentencing.., suffers from defects." Morse, supra note 36, at 398.
Morse originally proposed modeling the language of his proposed generic partial
defense along the lines of the MPC's "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" manslaughter
provision. See Morse, supra note 36, at 400. But cf. Dressier, Difficult Subject, supra note 21, at 986
n.114. ("In my view, any generic partial excuse ought to be more explicit than the EMED
language regarding the 'central excusing notion.'"). Morse has more recently modified the
language of his proposal. See Morse, supra note 32, at 300 (proposing alternative formulation
according to which "[tihe jury may find the defendant [guilty but partially responsible] if, at
the time of the crime, the defendant suffered from substantially diminished rationality for
which the defendant was not responsible and which substantially affected the defendant's
criminal conduct"). Morse notes that his proposal has been "substantially influenced" by a
similar proposal advanced several years ago by Herbert Fingarette and Anne Fingarette Hasse.
See id. at 299 n.23 (citing HERBERT FINGARE'ITE & ANN FINGARETTE HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES
AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILI-TY 254-57 (1979)).
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provocation hesitate to extend him the benefit of the defense.' 8
Nonetheless, insofar as the hot-headed actor kills only because he fails to
exercise self-control, isn't the akrasia theory forced to afford him the
defense?
Not necessarily. The akrasia theory requires not only that the actor have
the capacity to control his desire to kill. It also demands that the actor try to
exercise that capacity.5 9 If, as might reasonably be supposed, the so-called
hot-headed actor is one who characteristically or routinely fails to exercise
self-control because he does not even try to exercise it, or just does not care
enough to try to exercise it, then he has little, if any, claim to our
sympathies, nor should he have any claim to the defense.' 90 On the contrary,
the hot-headed actor, so understood, can be fairly grouped with the defiant
actor. The moral difference between an actor who does not care enough to
188. See, e.g., Regina v. Smith, [2000] 4 All E.R. 289, 318 (H.L.). The court stated:
Society should require that [an actor] exercise a reasonable control over himself,
but the limits within which control is reasonably to be demanded must take
account of characteristics peculiar to him which reduce the extent to which he is
capable of controlling himself. Such characteristics as an exceptional pugnacity or
excitability will not suffice.
Id (opinion of Lord Clyde).
189. The distinction between an actor who tries but fails to exercise self-control and one
who does not even try raises a "certain paradox about self-control." See MELE, supra note 25, at
62. An actor will need to exercise self-control when he believes he should ip but lacks sufficient
motivation or desire to (p at the moment of acting. But if he lacks sufficient motivation or desire
to (p, and instead wants to not-p more than he wants to (p, then from where does he get his
desire or motivation to exercise his capacity for self-control so as to alter his balance of
motivation in favor of tp-ing? Philosophers have offered various solutions to this paradox. See,
e.g., id., at 55 (resolving the paradox by reference to "compound" first-order desires), JEANETrE
KENNE1T, AGENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY: A COMMON,-SFNsE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 139 (2001)
(resolving the paradox by reference to "cognitive habits"); John Bigelow et al., Temptation and
the Will, 27 AM. PHIL. Q. 39, 44 (1990) (resolving the paradox by reference to second-order
desires); Richard Holton, How is Strength of Will Possible?, in WEAKNESS OF WILL AND PRACTICAL
IRRATIONALITY, supra note 170, at 39, 58 (resolving the paradox by reference to a distinct
"faculty of will-power," which is "something like a muscle"); Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith,
Philosophy and Commonsense: The Case of Weakness of Will, in PHILOSOPHY IN MIND 141, 151
(Michaelis Michael &John O'Leary-Hawthorne eds., 1993) (resolving the paradox by reference
to "cognitive dispositions"); Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith, Frog and Toad Lose Control, 56
ANALYSIS 63, 70 (1996) (same); R. Jay Wallace, Addiction as Defect of the Will: Some Philosophical
Reflections, 18 LAW & PHIL. 621, 636 (1999) (resolving the paradox by reference to "volition,"
i.e., "a kind of motivating state that... [is] directly under the control of the agent"); R. Jay
Wallace, Three Conceptions of Rational Agency, 2 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 217, 236 (1999)
(same). For present purposes it seems unnecessary to enter this debate.
190. See, e.g., Ashworth, supra note 22, at 309-10 (implying that the "bad-tempered man"
described in English caselaw and commentary is one "who fail[s] to make [an] effort [to control
his temper]" (emphasis added)). Describing an actor as "hot-headed," "bad-tempered," or
"irascible" can of course carry other meanings. See, e.g., HORDER, supra note 16, at 103 (" [Blad-
tempered people consistently go wrong in their judgments of wrongdoing by far too hastily
judging that they have been wronged, and by judging that they have been wronged much more
seriously than they really have.").
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try to control his desire to kill (the hot-headed actor) and one who embraces
it (the defiant actor) seems pretty slim. Or to put it another way, an actor
who, due to indifference, exercises no effort to control a desire to kill
arguably belongs in the same moral category as one who embraces or
accepts that desire.
B. DIMNIsHED CAPAUcFY
Provocation is not the only legal doctrine designed to mitigate murder
to manslaughter. The doctrine of diminished capacity,1 9' also known as
diminished responsibility or partial responsibility, l 9' performs the same
job. 9' No effort to solve passion's puzzle would be complete without at least
some comment on how these kindred doctrines relate to one another.
Examining the relationship between provocation and diminished capacity
should also shed additional light on the akrasia theory.
The surface differences between the two doctrines are twofold. First,
provocation requires something to have provoked the actor. Diminished
capacity requires no such provocation. Second, whereas provocation is a
doctrine upon which any psychologically normal or ordinary actor can rely,
191. Two distinct doctrines travel under the label "diminished capacity," usually referred to
in the American literature as the "mens rea variant" and the "partial responsibility variant." The
mens rea variant permits the use of evidence of mental abnormality to negate a mental state
required for conviction, i.e., to establish a failure-of-proof defense. The partial-responsibility
variant permits tre use of evidence of mental abnormality to establish a partial excuse. See, e.g.,
StephenJ. Morse, Diminished Capacity, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 169, at
239, 240-42 [hereinafter Morse, Diminished Capacity] (explaining the distinction); Stephen J.
Morse, Undiminished Confuasion in Diminished Capacity, 75J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1984)
(same). The doctrine discussed in the text is the partial-responsibility variant. Although I use
the term diminished capacity in deference to what appears to be the prevailing convention in
the American literature, the concept of diminished capacity suffers in my view from the same
conceptual incoherence as does the idea of partial incapacity. See supra pp. 1704-05.
192. See I ROBINSON, supra note 17, § 101, at 474. The doctrine in the U.K. is known as
"diminished responsibility," codified as section 2 of the English Homicide Act of 1957. See
Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 1l, § 2 (Eng.) ("Where a person kills.., another, he shall
not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind... as
substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing... the
killing."). For helpful overviews of the history and application of the English doctinle, see R.D.
MACKAY, MENTAL CONDITION DEFENCES IN TIlE CRIMINAL LAW 180-206 (1995); EDWARD E.
TENNANT, THE FUTURE OF THE DIMINIStED RESPONSIBILITY DEFENCE TO MURDER 1-70 (2001);
R.D. Mackay, Diminished Responsibility and Mentally Disordered Killers, in RETHINKING ENGLISH
HOMICIDE LAW, supra note 32, at 55.
193. Although recognized in section 2 of the English Homicide Act of 1957, "[flew
[American] states" recognize the partial-responsibility variant of diminished capacity. DRESSLER,
supra note 17. § 26.03, at 366. Nor is it recognized under federal law. See, e.g., United States v.
Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 890 (3d Cir. 1987) ("We conclude that... Congress intended.., to
prohibit the defenses of diminished responsibility and diminished capacity."). The MPC's
manslaughter provision was intentionally crafted to encompass both provocation and
diminished capacity. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a), at 54 (1980) (stating that the
language of the MPC's manslaughter provision "may allow an inquiry into areas which have
been treated as part of the law of diminished responsibility or the insanity defense").
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diminished capacity is reserved for actors who are in some way
psychologically abnormal.' 94 Consequently, while evidence of the diminished
actor's psychological profile is relevant to his plea for mitigation, evidence
related to the provoked actor's psychological profile is not.195 Unlike his
diminished counterpart, the provoked actor is supposed to be as normal as
you and me.
But the differences between the two doctrines are only at the surface,
since the ground upon which a provoked actor and a diminished actor claim
mitigation should be seen as common ground. Each admits he violated the
law; moreover, each claims to have done so only because at the moment of
acting he either made an honest mistake of law or else failed due to
weakness of will to follow his better judgment in favor of compliance.
Consequently, the provoked actor and the diminished actor differ not so
much in the substance of their plea as in the story each tells and in the evidence
194. See, e.g., Dressier, Difficult Subject, supra note 21, at 985 ("Provocation deals with the
emotions and actions of ordinary persons, whereas diminished capacity relates to the thinking
processes and actions of unordinary persons. Provocation deals with ordinary human
weaknesses, while diminished capacity focuses on special weaknesses, on illnesses and
pathologies."); Dressier, Heat of Passion, supra note 21, at 459 ("Diminished capacity involves a
mental disturbance which peculiarly involves the killer. Heat of passion is a concession to
human weakness, to a universal human condition.'). As used in section 2 of the 1957 English
Homicide Act, the phrase "abnormality of mind" has been read
wide enough to cover the mind's activities in all its aspects, not only the perception
of physical acts and matters, and the ability to form a rational judgment as to
whether an act is right or wrong, but also the ability to exercise will power to
control physical acts in accordance with that rational judgment.
Regina v. Byrne, [1960] 2 Q.B. 396, 403.
195. A robust debate over the validity of this claim has recently erupted in the U.K in light
of the House of Lords decision in Regina v. Smith, [2000] 4 All E.R. 289 (H.L.), in which the
Law Lords held that ajury was entitled to take account of an actor's depression in assessing the
reasonableness of his loss of self-control with respect to a plea of provocation. Compare C.D.
Freedman, Restoring Order to the Reasonable Person Test in the Defense of Provocation, 10 KING'S C. LJ.
26 (1999) (criticizing the Court of Appeal's opinion in Smith, which was affirmed by the House
of Lords); John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, Compassion without Respect? Nine Fallacies in R- v.
Smith, 2001 CRIM. L. REv. 623 [hereinafter Gardner & Macklem, Compassion] (criticizing Smith
on various grounds); Macklem & Gardner, supra note 22 (same), with Mackay & Mitchell, supra
note 187 (defending Smith). For further responses to Mackay and Mitchell, see James Chalmers,
Merging Provocation and Diminished Responsibility: Some Reasons for Scepticism, 2004 CRiM. L. REv.
198; John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, No Provocation without Responsibility: A Reply to Mackay &
Mitchell, 2004 CRIM. L. REv. 213. For their reply in turn, see R.D. Mackay & B.J. Mitchell,
Replacing Provocation: More on a Combined Plea, 2004 CRIM L. REv. 219 [hereinafter Mackay &
Mitchell, Replacing Provocation]. The Smith decision has also prompted a comprehensive review
of English provocation doctrine by the English Law Reform Commission, whose final
conclusions can be found in LAW COMM'N, PARTIAL DEFENCES TO MURDER: FINAL REPORT
1.13, at 4 (Aug. 6, 2004) (setting forth the "principles which.., should govern a reformed
partial defense of provocation"), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/Ic290.pdf.
According to one pair of commentators, the "Commission's recommendation appears to treat
provocation as a plea of partial justification." Mackay & Mitchell, Some Thoughts, supra note 144,
at 48.
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each musters to support and substantiate it. The differences between the two
pleas boil down to proof and procedure.
The provoked actor tells everyman's story. He has no need to emphasize
the details of his own psychology in order to buttress his claim to have tried,
albeit unsuccessfully, to control his desire to kill. According to the
provocation story, anyone faced with the kind of provocation the provoked
actor faced might very well have failed in the heat of the moment
successfully to have exercised his powers of self-control, such that his
emotions and desires ended up getting the better of him.
In contrast, the diminished actor tells a very personal story. He uses
mental health experts to describe the minutiae of his mental and emotional
makeup. The point of introducing such evidence is not to show that he
could not know or conform his conduct to the law's demands. If his
problems reached those depths, then he would be insane. The point is
instead to persuade the trier of fact that his various mental abnormalities or
deficiencies made it especially difficult, though not impossible, for him to
understand the law, or if he did understand it, to conform his conduct
accordingly. Compared to the provoked actor, the diminished actor needs
to reveal much more about his personal biography in order to persuade a
fact-finder to believe his claim to have killed in ignorance or weakness, and
not in defiance. 9'
Some commentators nonetheless insist or imply that an important
moral distinction exists between provocation and diminished capacity.'
97
Diminished capacity, so the argument goes, is a plea no self-respecting moral
agent would enter. As a so-called "partial exemption" from criminal
196. The diminished-capacity story and the provocation story can of course be combined in
an appropriate case. An actor may point to some provocation on the part of the victim and to
some mental infirmity or abnormality making self-control harder for him than for those without
such an infirmity or abnormality. Because provocation and diminished capacity share the same
basis, any such story is in my view a perfectly coherent one to tell. See, e.g., Mackay, supra note
192, at 74 ("[Dlespite the fact that a verdict on the basis of both [provocation and diminished
responsibility] has been described as 'surety illogical' it has become clear that the two pleas are
not mutually exclusive.").
197. See, e.g., Dressier, Heat of Passion, supra note 21, at 460 ("If the criminal law is to
coherently deal with the provocation defense, any attempt to define or understand heat of
passion should be conducted separately from diminished capacity."); Gardner & Macklem,
Compassion, supra note 195, at 627 ("Pleas like diminished responsibility and insanity.., are
reserved[, unlike a plea of provocation,] for those who are not quite among us, who cannot
quite provide an intelligible account of themselves, and whose susceptibility to the full range of
human judgment is therefore in doubt."); Jeremy Horder, Betrueen Provocation and Diminished
Responsibility, 10 KING'S C. LJ. 143, 147 (1999) (arguing that the doctrines of provocation and
diminished capacity should be construed so as to "preserve the moral integrity of each
defense"); Macklein & Gardner, supra note 22, at 827 ("[T]he whole point of pleading
provocation rather than diminished responsibility is to garner the respect and self-respect that
flows from being judged by the proper standards.").
1740 [2005]
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liability,'98 it amounts to a confession of inadequacy and abnormality. The
diminished actor is an incomplete moral agent, and as such an incomplete
person. Provocation, in contrast, carries no such stigma. Any self-respecting
actor might, through no fault of his own, find himself having killed in the
198. Those who characterize diminished capacity as a partial exemption usually
characterize insanity and infancy as complete exemptions. Others characterize insanity and
infancy as status defenses. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091,
1098 (1985) (arguing that infancy and insanity are both status defenses). Consequently, one
might fairly suppose that exemptions are indistinguishable from status defenses. But see John
Gardner, The Mark of Responsibility, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 157, 162 (2003) (arguing that
while infancy is a status defense insanity is an exemption and not a status defense).
Although some commentators apparently see no real harm in treating insanity as a
status defense or exemption (assuming they mean the same thing), see, e.g., Duff, supra note 78,
at 62 n.47 (suggesting that not much turns on how insanity is classified so long as one
recognizes that insanity "is indeed a very different kind of excuse from such excuses as duress,"
since neither "share[s] just the same logic and structure"); Morse, Diminished Capacity, supra
note 191, at 247 n.38 (noting that "not ... much turns on" distinguishing "between cognitive
and volitional excuses, such as mistake and duress on the one hand, and status excuses, such as
infancy and insanity, on the other"), others argue that the status-exemption theory of insanity is
over-inclusive. See, e.g., Anthony Kenny, Can Responsibility be Diminished?, in LIABILITY AND
RESPONSIBILITY 13, 24-25 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1991) ("Treating madness
as a status rather than a factor ... gives a certified mental patient a license which is not given to
others: he knows that there are certain things which he may do without being held criminally
responsible, while all others not of the same status will be held responsible."); Christopher
Slobogin, A Rational Approach to Responsibility, 83 MICH. L. REv. 820, 832 (1985) (book review)
("[S]urely... a person can murder for irrational reasons one day and rob for rational reasons
the next.").
In contrast to the status-exemption theory of insanity, the traditional theory of insanity
calls an actor insane if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked the capacity to know or
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. In other words, he acts while in an excusing
condition (lack of capacity) for which be is presumably not culpably responsible, arising as it
does from a mental disease or defect. If the status-exemption theory is over-inclusive, then the
traditional incapacity theory is arguably under-inclusive, inasmuch as it fails to account for all
cases in which we would intuitively describe the actor as "insane." See, e.g., Michael S. Moore,
Mental Illness and Responsibility, 39 BULL.. MENNINGER CLINIC 308, 317 (1975) (making this claim
against the traditional incapacity theory).
One sensible response to the under-inclusiveness of the traditional incapacity theory
and the over-inclusiveness of the status-exemption theory is to say an actor is insane if the
particular beliefs or desires on which he acts in committing a crime can be characterized as
irrational. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, What Is So Special About Mental Illness, in DOING AND
DESERVING 272, 285 (1970) ("We get closer to the heart of the matter, I think, if we say that the
mentally ill criminal's motives are unintelligible because they are irrational."); Slobogin, supra,
at 831 ("For me, the unintelligibility of reasons [beliefs and desires] is a sufficient basis for
insanity."). But see Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability
in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2000) (arguing that "insanity should be eliminated
as a separate defense, but that. . mental illness should be relevant in assessing culpability only
as warranted by general criminal-law doctrines concerning mens rea, self-defense, and duress").
This theory is narrower than the status-exemption theory (since it looks to the irrationality of
the actor's beliefs and desires, not to the irrationality of the actor as such) and broader than the
traditional incapacity theory (since it looks to the irrational content or nature of the actor's
beliefs and desires, not simply to the actor's capacity to know the law or conform to its
requirements).
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heat of passion upon adequate provocation. In short, the argument
concludes, diminished capacity, unlike provocation, is a shameful plea to
make.I
Yet unless a diminished actor's mental or emotional abnormalities are
themselves features about which the actor should be ashamed, diminished
capacity should not be seen as a shameful plea. Again, the diminished actor,
unlike the insane actor, is not claiming that mental disease or defect
rendered him incapable of knowing or obeying the law. Nor is he claiming
to be exempt from blame or punishment because he fails to qualify as a moral
agent. Nor is he even claiming to be partially exempt. Indeed, the concept of a
partial exemption is incoherent.200 An actor is either eligible to participate
in the criminal law's game of praise and blame, or not. It makes no sense to
say an actor is half-in and half-out.
Instead, the diminished actor is claiming his mental and emotional
makeup made it harder, but not impossible, for him to know and conform
his conduct to the law's demands. The trier of fact should therefore believe
him when he says that he violated the law out of momentary ignorance or
weakness. Moreover, unless the diminished actor is culpably responsible for
the mental or emotional abnormalities under which he labors, he has no
reason to be ashamed of them. 20' The only thing about which he should be
ashamed is his failure to control his desire to kill, a desire he could and
should have controlled in spite of his mental and emotional baggage. But
that failure is one he shares with the provoked actor.
Because neither the provoked nor the diminished actor defies the law,
the point of punishing them cannot be to humble a defiant will. 202 When the
199. John Gardner and Timothy Macklem are the most forceful defenders of this position.
See, e.g., Gardner & Macklem, Compassion, supra note 195, at 627 ("Pleas like diminished
responsibility ...are reserved for those who are not quite among us .... [S]elf-respecting
people would rather that their cases fell under provocation than under diminished
responsibility."); Macklem & Gardner, supra note 22, at 827 ("IT]he whole point of pleading
provocation rather than diminished responsibility is to garner the respect and self-respect that
flows from being judged by the proper standards."). In my view, however, Gardner and
Macklem fail fully to appreciate the fact that provocation and diminished capacity are partial
defenses. Instead, they tend to assimilate provocation to duress and diminished capacity to
insanity, both of which (duress and insanity) are full excuses. Moreover, because they see duress
as a respectable excuse and insanity as a shameful exemption, they tend naturally to see
provocation as a respectable partial excuse and diminished capacity as a shameful partial
exemption. Furthermore, Gardner and Macklem's criticism of diminished capacity as a
shameful plea leaves them committed to the awkward proposition that battered women who kill
their batterers and who claim diminished capacity are less than complete moral agents. See
Macklem & Gardner, supra note 22, at 827.
200. Nicola Lacey appears to take the same view. See Lacey, supra note 121, at 119
("[E]xemptions should operate as total rather than partial defences.... .").
201. See Mackay & Mitchell, Replacing Provocation, supra note 195, at 221 ("[There is no
reason why the diminished defendant should be regarded as having less self-respect than his
provoked counterpart.").
202. Seesupra pp. 1692-1717.
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provoked actor and the diminished actor kill, they do so because, while they
could and should have exercised control over their desire to kill, they failed
to do so. This failure renders each of them fairly liable to the law's
chastisement, although the punishment assigned to them is and should be
less than that assigned to the defiant killer. But chastisement should only be
a part, and perhaps only a small part, of the law's purpose when it responds
to provoked and diminished actors.
The punishment of provoked and diminished actors should also, if not
primarily, be seen as an occasion for reformation. It should be seen as an
occasion to offer the actor the opportunity to improve his prospects for
successfully exercising his capacity for self-control in the future. Here is
where the surface differences between the provoked actor and the
diminished actor may begin to make a difference.
Because the provoked actor suffers from no identifiable mental or
emotional abnormality, efforts to improve his prospects for the successful
exercise of his capacity for self-control might be described as a form of
character education.03 He should be obligated to learn various strategies and
techniques for the effective exercise of self-control, as well as to fortify his
will to deploy those strategies and techniques.2 0 4 Ideally, the provoked actor
will discharge this obligation gladly, committing himself to his own self-
reform and the hard work it requires. The goal is for the exercise of self-
control to become for him more or less a matter of natural disposition andhabit, and thus a part of his character.2 In other words, beyond chastising
him for his culpable failure of self-control, the provoked actor's punishment
should insist on his making an honest effort to leave the ranks of the akratic
(whose efforts to exercise self-control often fail) and to join instead the
ranks of the enkratic (whose efforts often succeed).
203. For a helpfiul discussion of weakness of will as a failure of character (as opposed to a
failure of rational action), see Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Weakness of Will and Character, 14 PHIl TOPiCS
No. 2, at93 (1986).
204. The psychological literature supports the idea that an actor's will-power can over time
and with effort be strengthened. Consider this recent summary of the available research:
Research has begun to suggest that the capacity for altering the self is a furm of
strength. Specifically, altering the self requires a mental or psychological exertion.
Just as a muscle grows tired from exertion, the capacity for self-regulation becomes
depleted after it is used. Also like a muscle, the capacity for self-regulation appears
to grow stronger through regular exercise.
CHRISTOPHER PETERSON & MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, CHARACTER STRENGTHS AND VIRTUES 501
(2004) (internal citations to psychological studies omitted).
205. The character education I have in mind would seem to fit comfortably within the
mission statement of a liberal state, being limited as it is with respect to both means and ends,
As to ends, the only virtue it aims to teach is the virtue of self-control, also known as continence
or temperance. See Duff, supra note 27, at 147 (discussing the distinction between virtue and
continence). As for means, it should proceed through education, not Clockwork Oranga-like
indoctrination, and should thus exclude any technique, such as brainwashing or similar modes
of behavior modification, which violate an actor's autonomy.
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In contrast, because the diminished actor does suffer from some
identifiable mental or emotional abnormality, any effort to improve his
prospects for the successful exercise of self-control should first take the form
of some appropriate psychological treatment. The disorder at the root of his
failed effort to exercise self-control should be addressed through
appropriate and non-coercive means.
Of course, the point at which character education ends and
psychological treatment begins is sometimes hard to identify. Just as the line
between the provoked actor and the diminished actor can blur, so too can
the line between the two different ways in which the law should respond to
them. Are so-called anger management classes character education or
psychological counseling? Yet whatever the label, the ultimate goal is the
same. The punishment imposed on the diminished actor, just like that
imposed on the provoked actor, should chastise him for his failure on the
present occasion to successfully exercise his capacity for self-control, but it
should also offer him the opportunity to improve the state of his psyche,
thereby improving his prospects for the successful exercise of that capacity
in the future.
The defiant actor displays contempt for the law and excessive pride in
himself.2°6 In his mind, only the little people follow the law. Ideally, a defiant
actor will see or come to see his punishment as part of a larger process
through which he repents and atones for his offense, embracing his
punishment as a symbolic means to repudiate the contempt expressed
through his action. In other words, the defiant actor will ideally come to
understand his punishment as a form of secular penance through which he
expresses repentance and humility. Moreover, having endured this penance
he will have earned forgiveness and the right to be readmitted to full
membership in the community from which his crime has alienated him.
Provoked and diminished actors do not defy the law. Their actions
display no contempt for the law, nor excessive pride in themselves. The vice
displayed in the actions of the provoked and diminished actor is the lesser
vice of intemperance or incontinence. Provoked and diminished actors fail
to summon the self-control it takes to avoid violating the law. As such, these
actors must embrace the burden imposed on them, not as a symbolic
expression of the humility of a once-defiant will, but rather as an expression
of their commitment to a course of self-reform, a course embarked upon in
the hope that their efforts to exercise the virtue of self-control will meet with
greater success in the future.
206. The ideas contained in this and the following paragraph are developed at greater
length and in various contexts in Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong To Commute Death Row?
Retribution, Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319 (2004); Garvey, supra note 163; Stephen
P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 303; Garvey, supra
note 24.
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CONCLUSION
Provocation is a venerable but besieged defense. It fights on one front
against those who say it should be abolished.0 7 It fights on another against
those who would portray it as a reward for virtue and a punishment for
208
vice. In my view, the defense should be neither abolished nor so
portrayed. Instead, it should be retained and recognized as one way in which
the law separates those who defy its obligations from those who violate them
out of culpable ignorance or weakness. In other words, it should be
understood as a way to single out those "cases in which justice appear[s] to
require a concession to human frailty."
2 9
207. See sources cited supra note 32.
208. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 23, at 366 (stating that the provocation doctrine
"demands of people not only that they conform their conduct to a certain standard, but also
that they shape their characters, and the quality of their emotions, in accordance with
prevailing norms of reasonableness").
209. Regina v. Smith, [2000] 4 All E.R. 289, 302 (H.L.) (opinion of Lord Hoffman)
(emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has similarly noted,
The law, in recognition of the frailty of human nature, regards homicide
committed under the influence of sudden heat of passion, or in hot blood
produced by adequate cause, and before a reasonable time has elapsed for the
blood to cool, as an offence of a less heinous character than murder.
Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481, 510 (1898).
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